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et al.: Recent Cases

Recent Cases
AGENCY-APPARENT

AUTHORITY OF AGENT OF UNDISCLOSED

PRINCIPAL-RATIFI-

CATION.

Herkert Meisel Trunk Co. v. DuncanL
Under the terms of a conditional sale of the defendant's business, the purchasers, until the purchase price was paid, were to operate the business in their own
names, but as the agents of the defendants, and were to buy all merchandise for
cash. The agents bought goods from the plaintiffs on credit. The Plaintiffs now seek
to recover the purchase price from the defendant. Held, defendant is liable: (1)
as undisclosed principal initially bound by the act of the agent; (2) because
he had ratified the acts of his agent, having accepted the benefits of the transaction.
A disclosed principal is bound by the contracts made by his agent with express, 2
implied,z or apparent authority.4 It is well settled that an undisclosed principal
is liable for the acts of his agent done within his express or implied authority.,
Should such a principal be held liable for the acts of his agent done within the
apparent scope of his authority? The basis of holding a disclosed principal, in
the absence of express or implied authority, is his holding out to third parties
that his agent has the authority to act in a certain capacity, whether we follow
the objective theory of contracts and consider the holding out as a manifestation
of consent or follow the subjective theory and consider the holding out as the
basis of an estoppel.
Is there any such holding out by an undisclosed principal? It seems not,
since the principal is not even known. But, in a situation like the instant case,
does not the principal, nevertheless, hold out his agents as the owners of the business?
How far should this representation extend the principal's liability? Since the
plaintiffs dealt with the agents believing them to be the owners of the property
in the business, it does not seem far fetched to subject this property, at least, to the
the claims of the plaintiffs.
To hold the principal personally liable may seem to go beyond what is necessary to hold him to his representation.6 On the other hand, the principal's representation led the third party to believe that he was dealing with a business owner,
a member of a more responsible class than the one to which an agent belongs. It
seems proper, then, to impress liability upon the person who actually owns the
business; otherwise, the third party would get less than he bargained for. In the
Restatement of Agency, section 195, the rule is thus stated: "An undisclosed principal who entrusts an agent with the management of his business is subject to
liability to third persons with whom the agent enters into transactions usual in
such businesses and on the principal's account, although contrary to the directions of the principal." This rule is particularly equitable when, as in the principal
case, the principal has received the benefits of the business. As Mitchell, J., said
in Hubbard v. Tenbrook, 7 "To allow an undisclosed principal to absorb the profits,
and then, when the pinch comes, to escape responsibility on the grounds of orders
to his agent not to buy on credit, would be a plain fraud on the public."

1. 141 Kan. 564, 42 P. (2d) 587 (1935).
2. See 2 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed.
1914) § 1708.
3. See 1 MECriEM, AGENCY (2d ed.
1914) § 708.
4. See I MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed.
1914) § 720; STORY, AGENCY (9th ed. 1873)
§ 443.
5. Donner v. Whitecotton, 201 Mo.

App. 443, 212 S. W. 378 (1919); see 2 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1731.

6. It also seems to give the third party
a windfall, since when entering the contract he did not count on holding the
Principal responsible. But this is true
whenever the third party is given a right
against the undisclosed principal.
7. 124 Pa. St. 291, 16 Atl. 817 (1889).

(343)
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It is doubtful, however, that the false appearance of financial responsibility
which the undisclosed principal has given the agent can alone account for the
former's liability -on the latter's unauthorized contract. That giving false appearance of credit creates personal liability is a principle which possibly has not yet
gained afoothold in our law. Thus, it has been held, in a situation much like the
present one, that if the agent incurs an indebtedness on a matter unconnected
with the undisclosed principal's business, the latter is not liable therefor7a The
real basis of liability in a situation like that in the instant case is probably the
same one which underlies respondeat superior in a vicarious liability for tort, viz.,
that the act was done in furtherance of the business of the owner and within the
general scope of the agent's employment; the principal is liable (subject to limitations on this liability where the agency is disclosed and the third person is put
upon inquiry as to the extent of the agent's authority) simply because he owns
and controls the business and the act was done in the course of and for the business.
Does the doctrine of ratification apply in this case? "Ratification may briefly
be defined as the subsequent adoption and affirmance by one person of an act
which another, without authority, has previously assumed to do for him while
purporting to act as his agent." s From this definition it would appear that an
undisclosed principal can not ratify the unauthorized acts of his agent, and the
9
great majority of the courts in the United States and England so hold. Granting
that ratification is an anomalous doctrine,1o it seems an arbitrary limitation upon
the doctrine to preclude an undisclosed principal from ratifying, except for the
consideration that the undisclosed principal doctrine is an anomaly itself. The
same injustice occurs in both cases, if ratification is not permitted, namely, the
principal would get the benefits of the agreement and refuse to accept the burdens.
Nevertheless it is well settled that only a disclosed principal can ratify." The principal case presents no reason for making an exception to the usual ratification rule.
The Kansas Court has made an arbitrary exception to the established ratification
doctrine, unless it is willing to follow the Massachusetts rule and permit ratification
where the agent intended to act for the principal.12
C. D. TODD, JR.
ALIMONY-SUIT AFTER DIVORCE OBTAINED BY CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE.

Straub v. Straub,
Previous to this action plaintiff had secured an absolute divorce in Arkansas
2
where service by publication was had upon defendant. The Arkansas decree was
silent as to alimony, but had there been a provision for alimony, it would have
3
been void due to lack of personal jurisdiction over defendant. Plaintiff later
sued for alimony in Maryland where defendant was personally served. Recovery
7a. Yorkshire Banking Co. v. Batson,
L. R. 5 C. P. D. 109 (1880); Kinahan v.
Parry [1911] 1 K. B. 459. Cf. Gavin v.
Walker, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 643 (1885); McCracken v. Hamburger, 139 Pa. 326, 20
At. 1051 (1891). And see Hubbard v.
Tenbrook, 124 Pa. 291, 296, 16 At. 817.
8. 1 MECHEM, AGENCY, (2d ed. 1914)
§ 347.
9. Bank of Commerce v. Bernero, 17
Mo. App. 313 (1885); 1 MECHlEM, AGENCY
(2d ed. 1914) § 377.
10. 1 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914)
§ 346. But see Seavey, The Rationale of
Agency (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 859, 886 ff.
11. An occasional case has held that
the receipt of the benefits by an undisclosed
principal may be considered as a ratification. Barnett Bros. v. Lynn, 118 Wash.
315, 203 Pac. 389 (1922); Comment (1922)
22 COL. L. R. 465.
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12. Hayward v. Langmaid, 181 Mass.
426, 63 N. E. 912 (1902).
1. 183 Ad. 605 (Md. 1936).
2. It is established that a divorce decree based on constructive service at the
domicile is valid. Hinkle v. Lovelace, 204
Mo. 208, 102 S. W. 1015 (1907); Roberts
v. Fagan, 86 Kan. 536, 92 Pac. 559 (1907);
Sudbury v. Sudbury, 179 Iowa 1036, 162
N. W. 209 (1917).
3. Hutton v. Dodge, 58 Utah 228, 198
Pac. 165 (1921); Bridges v. Bridges, 46
R. I. 191, 125 At. 281 (1924); Doeksen v.
Doeksen, 202 Iowa 489, 210 N. W. 545
(1926); Wilson v. Smart, 324 Ill. 276, 155
N. E. 288 (1927); cf. Chapman v. Chapman, 194 Mo. App. 483, 185 S. W. 221
(1916) (local land awarded); Haddad v.
Haddad, 152 Okla. 280, 4 P. (2d) 110 (1931)
(local land awarded).
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was not allowed. It was held by the court that alimony was incidental to the marriage status. Thus after an absolute decree for divorce, alimony could not be obtained, for at that time there was no existing marriage status, it having been dissolved by the preceding divorce.
It is clear that where a statute expressly outlines when and under what circumstances alimony must be given, the statute controls. 4 But not all statutes
specifically provide for every situation where alimony might be demanded. Thus
in many states courts are left to determine, as a matter of policy, under what
circumstances alimony should be given. 5
There are several factors which might influence a court's decision in the situation presented by this case. The English rule of not allowing alimony except as
incident to the marriage status has been influential in America in spite of the fact
that the English situation is different from that in this country. 6 Many jurisdictions
including Maryland (in the principal case) and Missouri,7 have relied entirely
upon this view in determining the award of alimony.S The fundamental theory of
alimony is a factor that should not be overlooked. When granting alimony in
connection with an ordinary divorce a vinculo matrimonii courts announce that
the reason for allowing a wife recompense is based on a common law duty that her
husband owes her.? Many cases definitely state that this duty exists after the
marriage status is dissolved.O Courts bear this out each time they grant alimony
after a permanent divorce decree. The holding is reasonable, for if this duty ever
existed it should not be extinguishable by a divorce that might be brought about
through the fault of the husband.

4. McIntire v. McIntire, 80 Mo. 470
(1883); Smith v. Smith, 88 N. J. Eq. 319,
102 Ad. 381 (1917).
5. Woods v. Waddle, 44 Ohio St. 449,
8 N. E. 297 (1886); Thurston v. Thurston,
58 Minn. 279, 59 N. W. 1017 (1894); Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W.
977 (1910); Darnell v. Darnell, 212 Ill.
App. 601 (1918); Searles v. Searles, 140
Minn. 385, 168 N. W. 133 (1918); Honaker
v. Honaker, 218 Ky. 212, 291 S. W. 42
(1927).
6. Except in rare occasions only a divorce a mensa et thoro was granted in
England. Such decree was a suspension
from "bed and board" but left the marriage
in full force. Alimony was allowed after
the decree. In America, courts freely
grant a divorce a vinculo matrimonii which
puts an end to the marriage. In view of
the English cases the general statement
could be made that alimony is allowed only
as incident to the divorce decree. From
such generalization, the rule referred to
developed. Spain v. Spain, 177 Iowa 249,
158 N. XW. 529 (1916); BoUvIER's LAW
DICTIONARY

(Baldwin's Student ed. 1934)

312.
7. Doyle v. Doyle, 26 Mo. 545 (1858);
McIntire v. McIntire, 80 Mo. 470 (1883);
Keena v. Keena, 10 S. W. (2d) 344 (Mo.
1928); Laweing v. Laweing, 21 S. W. (2d)
2 (Mo. App. 1929); Pfeiffer v. Pfeiffer, 33
S. WV.(2d) 184 (Mo. App. 1930). Keena
v. Keena, supra, involved a situation similar
to the one presented by the principal case.
The holding was in accord with this case.
8. Eldred v. Eldred, 62 Neb. 613, 87
N. W. 340 (1901); Spain v. Spain, 177 Iowa

249, 158 N. W. 529 (1916); McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 183 N. W. 377 (1921);
Doekson v. Doekson, 202 Iowa 484, 210
N. W. 545 (1926); Franklin v. Bonner, 201
Iowa 516, 207 N. W. 778 (1926); Watson v.
Watson, 168 Ga. 573, 148 S. E. 386 (1929);
Long v. Long, 39 Ariz. 271, 5 P. (2d) 1047
(1931); Lyon v. Lyon, 243 Ky. 236, 47
S. W. (2d) 1072 (1932).
9. Anderson v. Norvell-Shapleigh
Hardware Co., 134 Mo. App. 188, 113 S. W.
733 (1908); Herrick v. Herrick, 319 111.146,
149 N. E. 820 (1925); Duss v. Duss, 111 So.
382 (Fla. 1927); Brown v. Brown, 48 R. I.
420, 138 Ad. 179 (1927); Burdette v. Burdette, 153 S. E. 150 (W. Va. 1930); Metcalf
v. Metcalf, 244 Ky. 536, 51 S. W. (2d) 675
(1932). Some cases base the duty on contract: Schooley v. Schooley, 184 Iowa 835,
169 N. W. 56 (1918); Nelson v. Nelson, 282
Mo. 412, 221 S. W. 1066 (1920); Heafey v.
Heafey, 254 N. Y. Supp. 82, 142 Misc.
Rep. 147 (1932).
10. Lape v. Lape, 99 Ohio St. 143, 124
N. E. 51 (1918); Salinko v. Salinko, 177
Wis. 475, 188 N. W. 606 (1922); Hambrecht v. Hambrecht, 128 Ore. 305, 274
Pac. 507 (1929); Cary v. Cary, 112 Conn.
256, 152 At. 302 (1930); Swolec v. Swolec,
122 Neb. 837, 241 N. W. 771 (1932);
Heard v. Heard, 116 Conn. 632, 166 Atl.
67 (1933). Contra: Downey v. Downey, 98
Ala. 373, 13 So. 412 (1893); Eldred v. Eldred, 62 Neb. 613, 87 N. W. 340 (1901);
Joyner v. Joyner, 131 Ga. 217, 62 S. E. 182
(1908); Darby v. Darby, 152 Tenn. 287,
277 S. W. 894 (1926); Hughes v. Hughes,
211 Ky. 799, 278 S. W. 121 (1925).
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A holding such as that in the principal case enables a husband easily to evade
any legal enforcement of his obligations to his wife." A similar evasion would
also be made possible where a husband gets a divorce at his domicile on constructive
service without the knowledge of the wife and interposes that divorce decree as
a defense to a suit for divorce brought by the wife.12 Thus courts which do not
follow the rule that alimony must be incidental to the divorce decree, but grant
recompense to the wife in these two situations,"3 seemingly reach a result that is
both desirable and reasonable.
JOHN H. FOARD
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-DISCIPLINE--ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION.

In re Tall'; In re Gallant2
In the Tall case the respondent attorney published and advertised for sale
a booklet tending to encourage non-residents to come into Missouri for divorce
by stating, among other things, that the state's peculiar law makes it almost impossible for nonresidents to discover the fact that suits for divorce had been filed.
In response to requests for the book, he sent a form letter requesting a statement
of marital troubles, a retainer fee, and enclosed a newspaper reprint extolling his
virtues as a divorce lawyer and naming his town as a coming divorce mill with
hopes of excelling Reno. As a result of these advertisements a number of out of
state people secured divorces through respondent's effort as attorney. On action
for disbarment, it was held that he was guilty of at least gross misconduct justifying six months' suspension. In the Gallant case a firm of two lawyers hired
agents and runners to solicit claims. These agents and runners induced many
persons to employ the law firm with respect to damage claims for alleged personal
injuries. Contracts were entered into by the terms of which the respondent attorneys were to receive fifty percent of any amount collected upon the claims,
and they further agreed to pay the expenses of physical examinations of the clients.
Respondents made wholesale settlements of many such claims against a single
company, and pro-rated the settlement money among the clients and kept fifty
percent for themselves. Other individual claims were settled on the same percentage basis. On action for disbarment, both parties were suspended from practice
for one year.
In any disbarment or suspension proceeding, the question arises as to where
the court derives its jurisdiction. It is generally held that the right to practice
before courts is not inherent in the individual, but is a privilege granted by law
and subject to limitations and conditions necessary for the protection of the legal

11. The husband could absent himself
from the state during divorce proceedings
by the wife and thus prevent her recovery
of any alimony. Eldred v. Eldred, 62
Neb. 613, 87 N. W. 340 (1901); McCoy v.
McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 183 N. W. 377 (1921);
Doeksen v. Doeksen 202 Iowa 484, 210 N.
W. 545 (1926); Darby v. Darby, 152 Tenn.
287, 277 S. W. 894 (1926); cf. Spain v.
Spain, 177 Iowa 249, 158 N. W. 529 (1916).
12. Cook v. Cook, 56 Wis. 195, 14 N.
W. 33 (1882); Downey v. Downey, 98 Ala.
373, 13 So. 412 (1893); Joyner v. Joyner,
131 Ga. 217, 62 S. E. 182 (1908); Hughes
v. Hughes, 211 Ky. 799, 278 S. W. 121
(1926).
13. Cases allowing alimony when divorce
was previously secured by wife: Woods v.
Waddle, 44 Ohio St. 449, 8 N. E. 297
(1886); Weidman v. Weidman, 48 N. E.
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506 (Ohio 1897); Adams v. Abbott, 21
Wash. 29, 56 Pac. 931 (1899); Darnell v.
Darnell, 212 Ill. App. 601 (1918); Spradling
v. Spradling, 74 Okla. 276, 181 Pac. 148
(1919); West v. West, 114 Okla. 279, 246
Pac. 599 (1926). Cases allowing alimony
when divorce was previously secured by
husband: Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn.
279, 59 N. W. 1017 (1894); Rodgers v.
Rodgers, 56 Kan. 483, 43 Pac. 779 (1896);
Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131
S. W. 977 (1910); Searles v. Searles, 140
Minn. 385, 168 N. W. 133 (1918); Davisv.
Davis, 70 Colo. 37, 197 Pac. 241 (1921);
Honaker v. Honaker, 218 Ky. 212, 291
S. W. 42 (1927); Keena v. Keena, 10 S.
W. (2d) 344 (Mo. 1928).
1. 93 S. W. (2d) 922 (Mo. 1936).
2. 95 S. W. (2d) 1249 (Mo. 1936).
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department of the government and of the public.' The courts have inherent power
to determine what persons shall be admitted to the bar. 4 It follows that as a
necessary and inherent incident of such power the courts also have the right to
remove or to suspend attorneys for unworthy behavior, independent of any statutory enactment.6 Such inherent jurisdiction residing in the court has been found
even where a state constitution6 specifically mentions certain cases wherein the
court has jurisdiction and does not mention suspension or disbarment.7 The action
of disbarment is considered neither criminal nor civil, but is a proceeding sui
generis, the object of which is not the punishment of the accused, but is the protection of the court and the public.8 Although the accused has the right to a hearing
with the opportunity to defend, 9 yet the procedure need not conform to the rules
of criminal proceedings.10 Provision is made by the Missouri Supreme Court
for a bar committee to investigate and report on charges of unethical conduct of
lawyers practicing before Missouri courts." It appears that it was on the report
of this bar committee that In re Gallant was instituted. The court adopted the
procedure to be used in the face of a state statute dealing with disbarment, 12 the
court courageously declaring that each department of the government has by its
very nature the inherent power to accomplish objects naturally in the orbit of
that department unless expressed otherwise in the constitution, and further, that
the power to admit and to disbar and to establish the rules therefor belongs to the
judicial branch."3
Although the power to disbar is held inherent in the courts, yet it is recognized
that this power to disbar should be exercised with great caution. 4 The primary
question for the court is the attorney's moral fitness for the practice of law.", In
considering this the court can take into consideration thereputation of the attorney.'6
The court determines what acts constitute grounds for disbarment.'Y Courts differ
as to the weight to be given to the codes of ethics adopted generally by the various
state bar associations. One jurisdiction has adopted the state bar code of ethics
by statute.'0 Some courts give it the effect of previous decisions holding the same
way. 0 Other jurisdictions hold it as educational only and of no necessary effect.' 0
The Missouri Supreme Court has by rule adopted the American Bar Association
canons of ethics to be the measure of conduct and responsibility of the members
of the bar practicing before the Missouri Supreme Court and of all courts over
which it has superintending control.2L The American Bar Association canons
of ethics state in effect that solicitation of business and advertising for business
where not warranted by personal relationship is unprofessional. 2 2
3. Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals,
4 F. (2d) 422 (App. D. C. 1927), a.fd, 297
U. S. 117 (1925).
4. In re Chapelle, 71 Cal. App. 129,
234 Pac. 906 (1925).
5. State ex rel. Attorney General v.
Harber, 129 Mo. 271, 31 S. W. 889 (1895),
on motion for reinstatement, 138 Mo. 196,
39 S. W. 773 (1897).
6. Mo. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 3.
7. In re Sizer, 300 Mo. 369, 254 S. W.
82 (1923).
8. In re Davis, 166 S. W. 341 (Mo.
App. 1914).
9. State ex rel. Shackelford v. McEIhinney, 241 Mo. 592, 145 S. W. 1139 (1912).
10. In re Bowman, an unreported decision by the Supreme Court of Missouri.
The writer examined the original record of
the case.
11. Supreme Court Rule 36.
12. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 11107,
11715.

13. In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63
S. W. (2d) 672 (1933); Wheaton, Courts
and the Rule-Making Powers (1936) 1 Mo.
L. REv. 261; Clark, Missouri's Accomplishments and Program for Eliminating
the Unlawful Practice of Law (1936) 22
A. B. A. J. 9.
14. In re Sizer, 306 Mo. 356, 267 S. W.
922 (1924).
15. In re Hosford, 62 S. D. 374, 252
N. W. 843 (1934).
16. People v. Edelson, 313 Ill. 601, 145
N. W. 246 (1924).
17. In re Bowman, an unreported decision by the Supreme Court of Missouri.
The writer examined the original records.
18. Wash. Laws 1921, c. 126, § 15.
19. In re Morris, 43 S. D. 185, 178 N.
W. 732 (1920).
20. In re Clifton, 33 Idaho 614, 196
Pac. 670 (1921).
21. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 36.
22. Canons of Ethics American Bar
Assn., part II, §§ 27, 28.
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The authorities are clear that encouragement by attorneys of divorce litigation by means of advertising or by circulars so worded as to induce divorce proceedings and the employment of themselves therein constitutes grounds for disbarment or suspension.23 This uniformity of decision results from the prevalent
policy that dissolution of marriages should not be encouraged.24 In cases where
divorce is not involved and where there is no fraud and the solicitation is not so
crudely done as to lower the profession in the eyes of the layman, it has been held to
be merely bad taste to be punished by public opinion.25 But solicitation by paid touters is worse than solicitation by an attorney. 26 And when there is direct solicitation
of business for gain or procurement through touters and runners resulting in the
stirring up of litigation, it is considered such unprofessional conduct as is punishable by censure, suspension, or disbarment.27 In the Gallant case the respondents clearly went beyond mere bad taste and engaged in unprofessional conduct
deserving the discipline received.
ELMO HUNTER

CONFLICT OF LAws-LoCAL PUBLIC POLICY.

Mertz v. Mertz'
Suit was brought in New York for personal injuries resulting from the negligent conduct of the defendant in Connecticut. The plaintiff was the wife of the
defendant and by the Connecticut law could maintain a suit on this cause of action
against her husband. The New York court held that since a wife could not by
New York law sue her husband for personal injury,2 the action was against the
public policy of the state and should be dismissed.
The law of the place of the tort determines if the plaintiff has a cause of action,3
though it may or may not be enforceable at the forum. The Restatement of conflict
of laws states that, "No action can be maintained upon a cause of action created
in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy
of the forum." 4 This applies only to causes of action so contrary to public policy
that the forum will with-hold the use of its courts altogether in enforcing them.
In attempting to define public policy the New York court has said that it is "our
own sense of justice and equity."5 The court in the instant case states that New
York has no public policy except what is to be found in its constitution and laws.
At another time the court said that they "do not close their doors, unless help
would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal." 6 These general
expressions do not meet the issue. Apparently no clearly defined concept of public
policy is to be found in the cases.

23. Canons of Ethics American Bar
Assn., part II, §§ 27, 28; People ex rel.
Moses v. Goodrich, 79 Ill. 148 (1875); In
re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N. E. 495
(1928); Reno Bar Assn. v. Scoular, 34 Nev.
313, 123 Pac. 13 (1912).
24. People v. MacCabe, 18 Colo. 186,
32 Pac. 280 (1893); in re Schnitzer, 33 Nev.
581, 112 Pac. 848 (1911).
25. Ibid.
26. Chreste v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky.
77, 186 S. W. 919 (1916); (1935) 8 So.
CALIF. L. REV, 239.
27. In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. C.
Md. 1934).
1. 271 N. Y. 466, 3. N. E. (2d) 597
(1936).
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2. In Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 159
N. E. 656 (1927), Pound, J., by dissenting
opinion, attempts to show that this interpretation of the statute is ill-founded and
the law of New York should not forbid a
wife to sue her husband for personal injuries.
3. Schaefer v. 0. K. Tool Co., 110
Conn. 528, 148 At. 330 (1930); Woodard
v. Bush, 282 Mo. 163, 220 S. W. 839 (1920);
Taylor v. Integrity Mutual Casualty Co.,
216 Mo. App. 599, 265 S. W. 881 (1924).
4. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) § 612; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1935) § 445.1.
5. Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. N. Y. Trust
Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 (1934).
6. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224
N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N. E. 198, 202 (1918).
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The theory of vested rights is followed in some states and has been recognized
in New York.7 By this theory the court of the forum recognizes that an obligation exists to give effect to rights which are created and have become vested under
the law of another jurisdiction. Courts taking this view will be less inclined to
refuse to adjudicate the issue than courts which regard the problem as one of
expediency and so-called comity. The principal case does not mention the vested
rights theory.
In the dissent to the present case, Couch, J., vigorously attacks the proposition that to allow this suit would be against the public policy of the state. "Conjugal peace would be as seriously jarred by an action for breach of contract, or on
a promissory note, or for an injury to property, real or personal, all of which the
law permits, as by one for personal injuries." The dissenting opinion in effect
adopts the vested rights theory and adds a reservation by stating that "each
State shall give effect to all valid causes of action created by the laws of another
State except possibly in extreme cases." This seems to be the better view.
Missouri still applies the common law rule that an action by the wife against
the husband for personal injuries cannot be maintained.8 The question involved
in the principal case has not been decided in Missouri. The Supreme Court has
said by way of dictum, when considering if a wife could sue her husband for tort,
that it was governed "by the rule that the extent of the right conferred must be
determined by the law where the remedy is sought. ' 9 But there is a Missouri
statute providing that whenever a cause of action has accrued under the laws of
another state, action thereupon may be brought in the courts of Missouri if "such
person or persons shall be authorized to bring such action by the laws of the state
or territory where the cause of action accrued."10 This statute has been construed
broadly," and if it is meant to cover the situation in the principal case, the suit
would be allowed in Missouri, and the question of local public policy would not
arise.
ALDEN A. STOCKARD
CONFLICT OF LAWS-WVHAT CONSTITUTES "DOING

BUSINESS."

Union Mutual Life Co. of Iowa v. DistrictCourt of City and County of Denverl
This case arises from an application for a writ of prohibition. Petitioner
is a life insurance company incorporated in Iowa with its only place of business
in Des Moines. It had a contract with a Colorado radio station whereby the radio
company agreed to advertise petitioner's insurance policies over its station, and upon
receiving any inquiries for insurance, to forward the same to petitioner in Des
Moines. Through this means petitioner wrote many policies for Colorado residents. The policies were written in Iowa and mailed to the applicants in Colorado. One such policy was written on the life of Clara Bailey, with Charles Bailey
named as beneficiary. The insured died, and Charles Bailey instituted a suit in
Colorado on the policy. In this suit service was had on petitioner under a Colorado statute providing for personal service on a corporation "doing business" in
Colorado by serving any agent of such corporation found in Colorado2. Petitioner's
agent who was served in this suit was in Colorado to adjust Charles Bailey's claim.
Petitioner, on the theory that it was not doing business in Colorado, moved to
quash the services of summons, the denial of which motion is the basis of the appli-

7. Id. at 109, 120 N. E. at 201.
8. Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177
S. W. 382 (1915); Butterfield v. Butterfield,
195 Mo. App. 37, 187 S. W. 295 (1916);
Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S. W.
(2d) 1084 (1933).
9. Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177

S.W. 382 (1915).
10. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) § 705.
11. State ex rel. v. Guaranty Co., 322
Mo. 121, 14 S.NV. (2d) 576 (1928).
1. 97 Colo. 108, 47 P. (2d) 401 (1935).
2. CoLo. CoMP. LAWS (1921) § 40(9).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1936

7

xMissouri
MISSOURI
REVIEW
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 1, Iss.
4 [1936], Art. 5
cation for the writ of prohibition. The supreme court of Colorado denied the
writ and held that the petitioner was doing business in Colorado and that, therefore, the statute was applicable and the service was good.
What constitutes doing business varies according to the purpose of the statute
in question. A greater amount of local activity may be required for doing business
under a penal or taxation statute than under such a statute as is found in the
principal case merely subjecting the foreign corporation to service of process. 3 It
is essential to the constitutional applicability of such statutes that the foreign
corporation be doing business in the state, 4 and what acts of the corporation constitute "doing business" within the terms of the statute is a question of fact; but
the theory is that the acts must be of such a nature that the corporation by virtue
of doing them can be said to be present in the state.5
Some states, including Missouri, take the view that a corporation to satisfy
this requirement must transact a substantial amount of its ordinary business in
the state where service is sought. 6 The Missouri statute providing for personal
service on a foreign corporation is substantially the same as that of Colorado, 7
but in contrast to the Colorado holding in the principal case, Missouri has held
that a foreign corporation which sends an agent into Missouri to investigate a
claim against the corporation is not doing business in Missouri,' and that a foreign
corporation which regularly sends salesmen into Missouri to accept orders for
goods on behalf of the corporation from Missouri retail storekeepers is not doing
such business in Missouri as will permit service of process under the Missouri
statute. 9 It is doubtful whether Missouri would hold that the facts in the Colorado case amounted to doing business, although Missouri has not decided the
question in connection with radio advertising.
The interpretation given by the Missouri courts to the Missouri statute
has been upheld in the Federal courts. 0 It is likely also that the United States
Supreme Court would uphold the Colorado interpretation of its statute in the
principal case if the facts showed acts done by the foreign corporation in excess
of mere solicitation of business, as in the case of International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, where it was found that the foreign corporation through its agents
not only took orders for goods in Kentucky, but accepted checks, drafts and notes
in payment therefor.,
The decision of the Colorado Supreme Court represents the extreme view
as to what constitutes doing business. Most courts, including Missouri, probably
would not accept such an interpretation, but since radio advertising over local
radio stations has become a customary means of getting business, courts may in
the future give greater significance to this fact in determining what is doing business.
S. PAUL KIMBRELL
CONTRACTS-MORAL CONSIDERATION.

Webb v. McGowin'
This was an action in assumpsit to recover installments alleged to be due on
a contract. Plaintiff, an employee of a lumber company, was engaged in clearing
3.

Isaacs, A4n Analysis of Doing Busi-

ness (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 1018.

4. Riverside and Dan River Cotton
Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189 (1915).
5. Isaacs, loc. cit. supra note 3.
6. Painter v. Colorado Springs & Cripple Creek Dist. Ry. Co., 127 Mo. App. 248,
104 S. W. 1139 (1907); Nathan v. Planters
Cotton Oil Co., 187 Mo. App. 560, 174 S.
W. 126 (1915); Bauch v. Weber Flour
Mills Co., 210 Mo. App. 666, 238 S. W.
581 (1922).
7. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) § 728.
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8. Painter v. Colorado Springs & Cripple Creek Dist. Ry. Co., 127 Mo. App. 248,
104 S. W. 1139 (1907).
9. Bauch v. Weber Flour Mills Co.,
210 Mo. App. 666, 238 S. W. 581 (1922).
10. St. Louis Wire-Mill Co. v. Consolidated Barb-Wire Co., 32 Fed. 802 (C .C.
E. D. Mo. 1887).
11. International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914); cf. Green
v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Ry.
Co., 205 U. S. 530 (1907).
1. 168 So. 196 (Ala. 1935).
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the upper floor of a mill. In the course of his work it became necessary to drop a
75 pound block to the ground below. When plaintiff was in the act of dropping
the block, he observed the defendant's testator directly below him, in such position
that it was likely the falling block would strike the latter, and would inflict serious
bodily harm and even death. In order to prevent the block from striking defendant's testator, plaintiff held to the block in the course of its fall, controlling its
direction in such manner that defendant's testator was not injured. By holding
to and falling with the block, plaintiff suffered serious injury, as a consequence
of which he was rendered permanently crippled. Twenty-eight days later, in
consideration of the plaintiff having prevented him from sustaining injury, the
defendant's testator promised to pay to the plaintiff $15.00 every two weeks for
the remainder of the latter's life. These payments were continued for several
years until the death of the testator in January, 1934, when they were discontinued.
This action was commenced to recover the unpaid installments accruing up to the
time of bringing the action. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained on the
ground, inter alia, that the averments of the plaintiff's complaint showed that
the agreement was without consideration. The court of appeals reversed the
judgment and held that the plaintiff's act was a material benefit to the testator,
imposing upon the latter a moral obligation to compensate the plaintiff, and that
the testator's subsequent promise to pay was a "valid and enforceable contract."
It was said that the defendant's testator's subsequent promise to pay was an
affirmance or ratification of the services rendered, and that there was a presumption
that a previous request for the services was made.
This case brings us face to face with the doctrine of moral consideration,
a form of past consideration, whose foundations were laid in the middle of the
eighteenth century by Lord Mansfield, whose influence spread rapidly in England
until 1840. He applied the doctrine in several cases during his life and it appeared
in numerous cases after his death. For example, it was held that a promise by
overseers of the poor to pay for the expenses incurred in curing a pauper, 2 and a
promise by a widow to indemnify one who had advanced money to another at
her request during her coverture when she was incapable of contracting,' were
enforceable. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the doctrine
was restricted, and the court of Queen's Bench announced as an accurate statement of the law that, "An express promise . . . can only revive a precedent good
consideration, which might have been enforced at law through the medium of an
implied promise, had it not been suspended by some positive rule of law, but
can give no original right of action, if the obligation, on which it is founded, never
could have been enforced at law, though not barred by any legal maxim or statute
provision." 4 From an examination of the authorities there can be no doubt that
the doctrine of moral consideration is wholly discredited in England.' The courts
in most of the states in the United States, including the courts of Missouri, have
rejected the doctrine, even though some exceptional cases of liability on promises
made without present consideration, may still exist, as in the case of promises
to pay debts barred by the statute of limitations, or by a discharge in bankruptcy.6
The exceptions are no longer based upon the theory of moral consideration, but
upon other grounds, and by the weight of authority moral consideration, as such,
is held legally insufficient to support a promise.7
2. Watson v. Turner, Buller's N. P.
129 (1667).
3. Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. 36
(1813).
4. Wennall v. Adney, 3 B. and P. 137,
140 (1802).
5. Binnington v. Wallis, 4 B. & Ald.
650 (1821); Beaumont v. Reeve, 8 Q. B.
483 (1846); Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 A.
& E. 438 (1849); Leake says: "It is obvious

that a promise moved by a sense of moral
obligation only, is simply voluntary; and
it is now settled [in England] in accordance
with the general rule, that no valid contract arises from it."

LEAKE, CONTRACTS

(7th ed. 1921) 453.
6. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed.
1936) § 148.

7. Farnham v. O'Brien, 22 Me. 475
Ind. 59 (1860);

(1843); Eakin v. Fenton, 15
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The principal case has gone a long way toward recognizing once more the
validity of moral obligation as a basis for contract. The court's argument is, however, inherently weak. The case at bar is sought to be distinguished from "the
class of cases where the consideration is a mere moral consideration or conscientious duty unconnected with receipt by promisor of benefits of a material or pecuniary nature." "Here the promisor," says the court, "received a material benefit consisting of defendant's testator having escaped injury."
But could the court say beyond a reasonable doubt, that had plaintiff failed
to act, the testator would not have been injured? Here it would appear the court
is speculating as to what might have been-certainly not a proper matter for the
court's determination.
Apparently, the court recognizes the weakness of its argument thus far, and
invokes a legal fiction to bolster its position, namely, that the testator's subsequent promise to pay is an affirmance or ratification of the services rendered,
and that there was a presumption that a previous request for the services was made;
that is, the court presumed that the testator, at some prior moment, requested
plaintiff to jump from the mill and save the testator from injury. Such a presumption is contrary to fact and against the weight of modern authority, which
finds such an implied request in cases where at the time of the services rendered
the circumstances were such that the law would imply a promise to pay on the
part of the one to whom such services were rendered.S There is no such implication in the principal case; the request for the services in this case, if such a request
be implied, would more properly be interpreted as a request for a gratuitous service
rather than a request for a service to be paid for. Likewise, the plaintiff would
render such a service as a gratuity with no intention or expectation of reward;
and when a gratuity is once bestowed, a later promise to pay for it is not enforceable.
In support of its position the court cites the case of Kenan v. Holloway. 9
An examination of this case, however, shows that it is not in point. In this case
the plaintiff had voluntarily paid a judgment then in force against the defendant,
concerning whose validity there was some doubt. Plaintiff had no intention of
making a gift, but intended to collect the amount of the payment from the defendant. Defendant subsequently promised to reimburse plaintiff for the money
expended. Assuming the judgment to be a valid judgment, then the defendant's
subsequent promise to reimburse the plaintiff for his money in payment thereof,
was a good and binding promise on the theory that where a benefit of pecuniary
value is furnished with no intention to make a gift, though with no previous re-

Gwinn v. Simes, 61 Mo. 335 (1875); Hendricks v. Robinson, 56 Miss. 694 (1879);
Kennerly v. Martin, 8 Mo. 698 (1884);
Wislizenus v. O'Fallon, 91 Mo. 184, 3 S.
W. 837 (1887); Stockton Bros. v. Reed, 65
Mo. App. 605 (1896); Bragg v. Israel, 86
Mo. App. 338 (1900); Berryman v. Becker,
158 S. W. 899 (Mo. App. 1913); McGuire
v. Hughes, 207 N. Y. 516 (1913); Nelson v
Diffenderffer, 178 Mo. App. 48, 163 S. W.
271 (1914); Rask v. Norman, 141 Minn.
198, 169 N. W. 704 (1918) (holding that it
is well settled that contracts entered into
or promises made on the basis of friendship
and goodwill unsupported by precuniary
or material benefit, create at most bare
moral obligations, binding only on the
conscience, a breach of which is not redressable in the courts.); Terry v. Terry,
217 S. W. 842 (Mo. App. 1919); Boone
County Milling & Elevator Co. v. Lowery,

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol1/iss4/5

248 S. W. 623 (Mo. App. 1923); Heckman
v. Van Graafeiland, 291 S. W. 190 (Mo.
App. 1927).
8. Chamberlin v. Whitford, 102 Mass.
448 (1869); Moore v. Elmer, 180 Mass. 15,
61 N. E. 259 (1901); LANGDELL, CONTRACTS
(1880) § 92.
9. 16 Ala. 53 (1894) (the court holding
in effect, that a voluntary payment of
money by one person for the use of another,
without a previous request, will not support a subsequent promise to refund, unless the payment is beneficial to the promisor. Seemingly, here the court recognizes
the general rule that moral obligation is not
sufficient to support a subsequent promise
to pay, but seeks to find some real and
valuable consideration to which it can attach the subsequent promise to pay, by
the theory of implied request).
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quest, a subsequent promise by one who has received the benefit may be enforced,1
whereas in the principal case, the benefit bestowed was intended originally as a
gratuity.
The analogy of the court that had testator been accidentaly poisoned, and a
physician without his knowledge or consent treated him, thus saving his life, a
subsequent promise to pay for such services would be valid, does not reach the case
at bar, for in such a case the physician would be performing professional services
under such circumstances that he would intend to charge and an implied promise
to pay would be raised at the time the services were rendered. The element of
gratuity just discussed would not enter into this situation.
We can well sympathize with the court in its desire to allow a recovery under
the peculiar circumstances of this case. But however much we may wish to extend
the number of promises of this nature that should be enforced, it is essential that
such promises should be clearly defined. The test of moral consideration may
vary with every individual. Should not this vague doctrine, difficult to apply,
yield therefore, to certainty and definiteness in the law? Indeed, one judge who
wrote a concurring opinion, expressed some doubt as to the correctness of the
decision.ix
WILLIAM W. VAN MATRE

CONTRACTS-AsSIGNMENT OF SALARY TO BE ]EARNED BY A PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER.

Kimball v. LedordL
Ledford held an unsatisfied judgment against Miss Tharp, a teacher in the
public schools of California. Shortly after this judgment was obtained, Miss Tharp
executed an assignment of her salary earned and to be earned in the future to
certain firms to whom she was indebted for the necessities of life. The California
Civil Code, §955, provides: "No assignment of, or order for, wages or salary shall
be valid unless at the time of the making thereof, such wages or salary have been
earned, except for the necessities of life... ." Plaintiffs, school officials who pay
Miss Tharp's salary, filed this bill of interpleader after claims had been made
upon them for her salary by the judgment creditor and by the assignees. At common law a public official may not assign future earnings, and the court observes
that the solution of the question here presented turns upon the determination
of whether a teacher in the public school holds a public office. It was held that
such a teacher does not hold a public office, but is only a contractual employee
and that the assignment was valid.
At the old common law a claim for wages like any other chose in action was
not assignable since the relation between the original debtor and creditor was regarded as a vital part of the obligation which could no more be changed than
any other term of the obligation.'- Later, however, the assignment became enforceable in equity, and eventually it was enforced at law.2 Today a valid assignment by an individual of future wages under an existing contract is allowed
3
by the common law in some states and by statute in others. It is important to
10. Drake v. Bell, 26 N. Y. Misc. 237,
55 N. Y. Supp. 945 (1899) (a promise to pay
a mechanic for repairs made by mistake on
defendant's house),
11. He said: "The questions involved in
this case are not free from doubt and perhaps the strict letter of the rule, as stated
by judges, though not always in accord,
would bar a recovery by plaintiff."
1. 57 P. (2d) 163 (Cal. App. 1936).
Ia. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed.
1936) § 405.

2. Holdworth, History of the Treatment of CGhoss in Action by the Common Law
(1920) 33 HARv. L. REv. 997; Cook, Alien.
ability of Choses in Action (1916) 29 HARVL. REv. 816.
3. Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal. App. 553,
102 Pac. 956 (1909); Duluth, S. S. & A. R.R.
v. Wilson, 200 Mich. 313, 167 N. W.
55 (1918); Rate v. Am. Smelting and Refining Co., 56 Mont. 277, 184 Pac. 478
(1919). It is not essential to the validity
of an assignment of future wages that the
contract of employment be definite as to
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remember that the assignment of future earnings must in all events be made
under an existing contract of employment, and not of earnings to arise from
expected employment to be secured in the future. The assignment of the latter
is invalid, since there is a mere possibility of future earnings, which the courts
will not recognize. 4 However, in some jurisdictions while an assignment of
wages under a contract not yet in existence conveys to the assignee no present
right, either legal or equitable, yet it operates, when the employment has been
secured and the wages have been earned, to give the assignee an equitable right
to collect them from the employer.5
Statutes, however, frequently change or modify the common law governing
assignments. The California Code is an example. A Missouri statute provides
that "all assignments of wages, salaries and earnings, not earned at the time the
assignment is made, shall be null and void."6 This statute has been upheld as a
valid exercise of police power, 7 and it has been held that wages are earned when
services have been rendered by the employee over a stated unit of time at an
agreed wage scale, whether the wages are payable or not;8 so that if daily wages
are to be paid at the end of each month and an assignment is made at the end
of the first week of that week's wages, the assignment is valid. The California
statute differs from the Missouri statute in that it allows the assignment of future
earnings if they are for the necessities of life. Missouri does not allow any assignment of future wages whether for necessities of life or not. It is evident that the
principal case would be decided differently in Missouri for this reason, and the
case would not hinge, as it does, on the determination of whether a school teacher
holds a public office.
Public officials at common law in England were not permitted to assign
9
their future earnings on the ground that it was against public policy. Most
courts in this country have adopted that rule.O The reason for the rule is that
the courts feel that the efficiency of the public service would be impaired by permitting public officers to assign their future earnings, since "one of the strongest
incentives to industrial exertion-the expectation of pecuniary reward in the
near future--would be gone.""I A few courts in this country have allowed public
officials to assign their future earnings, but in so doing they did not discuss the
validity of such assignments on the ground of public policy.12 An assignment by
a public officer of wages already earned, however, is valid.13 The efficiency of the
public service is not affected in any manner, and, therefore, it is not against public
policy.

the amount of compensation under it.
Wabash R.R. v. Smith, 134 Ill. App.
574 (1907). Nor does the period of employment have to be definite. Metcalf v.
Kincaid, 87 Iowa 443, 54 N. W. 867 (1893).
4. Globe Indemnity Co. v. West Texas
Lumber Co., 34 S. W. (2d) 896 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1930); 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra
Note la, § 413; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) §154.
5. Cox v. Hughes, 10 Cal. App. 553,
102 Pac. 956 (1909); Edwards v. Peterson,
80 Me. 367, 14 Atl. 936 (1888); 2 WILLISTON,

op. cit. supra note la, § 413.

6. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 2969.
7. Heller v. Lutz, 254 Mo. 704, 164 S.
W. 123 (1914).
8. Service Purchasing Co. v. Brennan,
226 Mo. App. 110, 42 S. W. (2d) 39 (1931).
9. Stone v. Lidderdale, 2 Anstr. 533
(179-).
10. Bang v. Dunn, 4 Pac. 963 (Cal.
1884); Bliss v. Lawrence, 58 N. Y. 442
(1874); in re Wilkes, 8 Cal. App. 659, 97
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Pac. 667 (1908); Anderson v. Branstrom,
173 Mich. 157, 139 N. W. 40 (1912); Tribune Reporter Printing Co. v. Homer, 51
Utah 153, 169 Pac. 170 (1917).
11. Schloss v. Hewlett, 81 Ala. 266, 1
So. 263 (1887).
12. Brackett v. Blake, 7 Met. 335
(Mass. 1844); Macomber v. Doane, 2 Allen
541 (Mass. 1861); State v. Hastings, 15
Wis. 75 (1862); see Nat'l Bank v. Fink, 68
Tex. 303, 304, 24 S. W. 256, 257 (1893);
Hooker v. McLennon, 236 Mass. 117, 127
N. E. 626 (1920).
13. Wood v. Brown County, 125 Neb.
692, 251 N. W. 839 (1934); Boster v. First
Nat'l Bank, 5 F. Supp. 15 (1934). If the
assignee of a public officer's salary not yet
earned has actually collected and reduced
to possession the proceeds of the claim,
he cannot be deprived of them. Roesch
v. W. B. Worthen Co., 95 Ark. 482, 130
S. W. 551 (1910); Carnegie Trust Co. v.
Battery Place Realty Co., 67 Misc. 452,
122 N. Y. Supp. 697 (1910).
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The question in the principal case is, as the court points out, are teachers
officials under the law that prohibits the assignment of future salaries by public
officials? A public office has been defined as "the right, authority, and duty, created
and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring
at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit
4
of the public," and "the individual so invested is a public officer."' The teacher,
although having an important public duty, exercises no sovereign power of either
the legislative, executive, or judicial departments, and is, therefore, not swithin
the definition. He is thus a contractual employee, and not a public officer."
The principal case is sound both on authority and principle.
MILTON I. MOLDAFSKY

CONTRACTS-FRAUD WITH RESPECT TO AN

ILLEGAL

CLAUSE

IN

THE

CONTRACT.

Taggart v.School District No. 52, Carroll County'
Plaintiff, on May 1, 1933, entered into a contract with the board of directors
of the defendant School District by the terms of which plaintiff was to teach for
the school district for the year 1933-34. One of the clauses in this contract provided as follows: "Be it further agreed, that the party of the first part [plaintiff]
declares she is not married, and that if she should become married at any time
during the school term of 1933-34, she shall immediately resign her position as
teacher and this contract shall become null and void." This clause was inserted
in the contract pursuant to a rule of the board that married women would not be
hired as teachers in the district. At the time this contract was executed, plaintiff
was in fact married. The school board discovered this fact in July and twice
thereafter notified plaintiff that the contract, because of the misrepresentation
therein, had been declared null and void, and would not be recognized as binding.
Plaintiff thereafter brought suit for breach of contract and obtained judgment in
the circuit court. The theory of plaintiff's cause of action was that the board of
directors had no legal right to adopt a rule prohibiting a teacher from marrying or
the employment of married ladies as teachers, and that the marriage clause in the
contract was illegal, null and void.
2
The Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the
clause in restraint of marriage was arbitrary, unreasonable, and void; and that
since the clause was void, there could be no fraud in respect to such a clause; and,
therefore, plaintiff should be permitted to recover on the contract. The decision
by this Court with respect to the illegality of the clause in restraint of marriage
was criticized by this writer in an earlier number of this Review.'
Meantime, the case has gone to the Supreme Court upon certification in this
Court, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the cause remanded with
direction to enter judgment in favor of defendant. The decision of the Supreme
Court was not, however, decided on the basis of whether a clause in restraint of
marriage in a teacher's contract is void. The Court, finding it unnecessary to

14.

MECHEM,

OFFICERS

PUBLIC

OFFICES

AND

(1890) § 1; see Leymel v. John-

son, 105 Cal. App. 694, 288 Pac. 858 (1930).
Police officers, municipal firemen, prosecuting attorneys, and clerks are but a few
of the many persons who have been held to
be public officers. 2 WILLISTON, Op. cit.
supra note la, § 417.

15.

Mootz v. Belyea, 60 N. D. 741, 236

N. W. 358 (1931); Kennedy v. Board of

Education, 82 Cal. 483, 22 Pac. 1042
(1890); Leymel v. Johnson, 105 Cal. App.
694, 288 Pac. 858 (1930).
1. 96 S. W. (2d) 335 (Mo. 1936).
2. 88 S. W. (2d) 447 (Mo. App. 1935).
3. (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 189.
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discuss this question, held that since plaintiff was married at the time the contract
was signed, her written contractual representation that she was not married was a
fraud upon defendant, and of such a nature as to affect defendant's willingness to
contract with plaintiff. The Court said that it would not aid a fraud-feasor by
enforcing a contractual obligation procured by means of fraudulent representations.
This holding of the Supreme Court overrules some rather questionable language of the Kansas City Court of Appeals. Although it seems to be a feasible
argument on the part of the Court of Appeals that there can be no fraud with
respect to a clause that is illegal, the fallacy in its holding as applied to this case
is that the court failed to take into consideration the fact that the school board
was under no obligation to hire any teacher, and had it been known that plaintiff
was married at the time that she signed the contract, she would not have been
offered the position. If the court concedes, as the appellate court did, that the
school board can refuse to hire a teacher for any reason whatsoever, then regardless
of whether the clause in restraint of marriage was illegal, the fact remains that
plaintiff's misrepresentation was of such a nature as to affect defendant's willingness to contract. Such a misrepresentation is a clear fraud upon defendant, and
plaintiff was rightfully not permitted to recover.
Of course, if it should be held that a school board could not refuse to contract
because of the fact that a teacher was married, then, perhaps, the view of the
Kansas City Court of Appeals would be justified. However, the restraint of
marriage doctrine has not been carried to such lengths, and, therefore, it appears
that that Court was not warranted in its decision on this point.
KIRK JEFFREY
CRIMINAL LAw-TRANSFER OF INTENT-RETENTION OF DEFENSE.

State v. Batson,
The defendant was tried for the murder of Dr. Poole. The evidence was that
he shot and killed a justice of the peace, and then in shooting at a constable killed
the doctor. The lower court's instruction was to the effect that if the defendant
did wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought, attempt
to shoot and kill Justice Rabenau, and in so doing shot and killed Dr. Poole, then
the intent which he had against Rabenau must be attributed to him in the killing
of Dr. Poole. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder. Held, the
judgment is reversed and the case remanded, because the evidence clearly shows
the defendant was shooting at the constable when Poole was killed and that the
justice had already been shot.
The doctrine of transfer of intent which the court applies in this case is an old
one and clearly settled. Blackstone puts the rule in simple form when he says
that, "if one shoots at A. and misses him, but kills B., this is murder, because of
the previous felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the other."' 2
This is an almost universal rule and was applied in 1886 by the Supreme Court of
Missouri, 3 and since that case was decided, it has been reiterated many times. 4
The rule as to the retention of defenses which the defendant would have had
against the intended victim is equally clear and almost as universally applied, but
it does not arise as often and is not so well known as the theory of transferred intent. This rule is that the unintentional killing of a bystander by a shot fired in
the exercise of the right of self-defense is excusable or justifiable if the killing of
the party intended to be killed would have been excusable or justifiable. 5 This

1. 96 S.W. (2d) 384 (Mo. 1936).
2. 4 BL. COMM. * 201.
3. State v. Payton, 90 Mo. 220, 2 S.
W. 394 (1886).
4. State v. Gilmore, 95 Mo. 554, 8 S.
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W. 359 (1888); State v. Renfrow, 111 Mo.
589, 20 S. W. 299 (1892); State v. Clark,
147 Mo. 20, 47 S.W. 886 (1898); State v.
Cavin, 199 Mo. 154, 97 S. W. 573 (1906).
5. 30 C. J. 88.
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rule has been followed in nearly all jurisdictions where the problem has arisen.
In a Texas case, 6 the court said that one who, shooting at another in self-defense,
hits and kills a third party, will be guilty of no offense. A Missouri case,7 decided
in 1930, held the defendant was entitled to an instruction on self-defense and manslaughter. The court said that any defense which the defendant might have
against the person shot at would be available against the person hit. In a later
Missouri case,8 the rule was again applied, the court holding that the defendant
was entitled to an instruction that if he killed the deceased while lawfully defending
himself from an attack by another person, he should be acquitted. These two
cases seem to be the only ones in Missouri that have directly decided this point,
but the rule has been upheld by dicta in all the cases in which it has been brought up.
DONALD H. CHISHOLM
DECEDENTS' ESTATES-AcTIONS AGAINST HEIRs-EXTRATERRITORIAL

EFFECT OF

NoN-CLAIM STATUTE.

Hagan v. Lantryl
Testator was an obligor of a note, to be paid on demand after one year, which
was executed in 1903 to the plaintiff as guardian for certain infants. He was a
resident of Kansas, while the guardian and infants were residents of Oklahoma.
A few months after the note was executed, testator died leaving his property by
will to the defendants. The estate was duly administered in Kansas and the executrix discharged in 1905. The plaintiff, being in Oklahoma and having had no
notice or knowledge of these events, did not file the note or make any claim against
the estate. The defendants, having received testator's property, sold it. In 1914
this suit in equity was commenced by the guardian against the defendants in the
county of their residence, Jackson County, Missouri, to establish and declare a
trust in the proceeds of the assets in favor of the plaintiff. Thereafter the infants,
having become of age, were substituted as plaintiffs. Judgment for the defendants
was reversed.
When a claim against an estate is not barred by settlement of the estate and
the applicable non-claim statute, the creditor may sue the heirs or distributees in
equity after the estate has been administered. 2 A common example of this is in
3
cases of claims which are contingent during the administration of the estate.
When a claim is barred by settlement of the estate and the applicable non-claim
statute, no suit can be maintained against the heirs or distributees. 4 Likewise,
when there has been no administration of the estate, the heirs or distributees cannot
be sued directly.5 In the principal case the claim was not contingent, but was
merely unmatured. Unmatured claims must ordinarily be presented or become
barred.s So here there can be no justification for suit against the heirs unless, for
some other reason, the Kansas proceedings and non-claim statute are not a bar to
the plaintiff's right to sue the distributees in Missouri.
It is well settled that the fact that the creditor is a non-resident of the domiciliary state will not prevent him from becoming barred there.7 Moreover, the

6. Gaines v. State, 67 Tex. Crim. Rep.
325, 148 S. W. 717 (1912).
7. State v. Stallings, 326 Mo. 1037, 33
S. W. (2d) 914 (1930).
8. State v. Fielder, 330 Mo. 747, 50
S. W. (2d) 1031 (1932).
1. 89 S. W. (2d) 522 (Mo. 1935).
2. State ex rel. Brouse v. Burnes, 129
Mo. App. 474, 107 S. W. 1094 (1908); 18
C. J. 953-957.
3. Rankin v. City of Big Rapids, 133
Fed. 670 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904); Parks v.

Murphy, 166 Ark. 564, 266 S. W. 673
(1924).
4. Reveal v. Stell, 56 Cal. App. 463,
205 Pac. 875 (1922); Cincinnati R. & Ft.
W. R. R. v. Heaston, 43 Ind. 172 (1873).
5. Craven v. State, 50 Ind. App. 30,
97 N. E. 1021 (1912).
6. Cincinnati R. & Ft. W. R. R. v.
Heaston, 43 Ind. 172 (1873).
7. Hale v. Coffin, 120 Fed. 470 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1903); Fields v. Mundy's Estate, 106
Wis. 383, 82 N. W. 343 (1900).
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plaintiff was not seeking, and could not have obtained ancillary administration in
Missouri, because the decedent had no property in the state at the time of his
death. 8 When ancillary administration may be obtained, the courts are divided
as to whether the administration proceedings and non-claim statute of the state
of the decedent's domicile is a bar in the ancillary state.9 Here the plaintiff was
simply suing to reach the proceeds of an estate which had already been administered in the domiciliary state. The court in the principal case says that the proceedings and non-claim statute of the domiciliary state cannot bar the plaintiff
because such statutes "do not have extra-territorial effect."
It would seem that both reason and policy are opposed to the view taken by
the court. An administration proceeding is an action in rem.O This is, undoubtedly, because statutes give probate courts general power to adjudicate all rights in
the property administered. The non-claim statute is a necessary and essential
part of the statutes giving this power, because without it the rights of non-claiming
creditors could not be barred. The purpose of non-claim statutes is to make
possible a speedy, effective, final and binding settlement of estates, and to cause
the title of the distributees and their purchasers to be secure. 1 In the principal
case, although the defendants were being sued in personam, the suit was for the
wrongful withholding of the proceeds of a res, title to which had been adjudicated
to be in the defendants by the Kansas probate proceedings. It appears, therefore,
that the plaintiff should be barred by the Kansas adjudication in rem,"2 and that
whether or not the Kansas non-claim statute is, in itself a bar, is irrelevant.
Even if the adjudication in rem does not bar the plaintiff's suit, it would seem
that the running of the domiciliary non-claim statute should. A Missouri statute"
requires courts of this state to give effect to the general statute of limitations of
the place where the cause of action arose. It would seem that there should be an
even stronger policy in favor of giving effect to applicable foreign non-claim statutes.' 4 The purpose of these statutes has been mentioned. That this object will
be defeated if non-claiming creditors are allowed to sue the heirs or distributees
for assets received whenever they can find them in another state is obvious.
Although the Federal courts hold that whether a foreign non-claiming creditor
can sue on his claim in a Federal court is governed by the law of the state of the
domicile of the decedent,' 5 what appears to be the only decision" of a state court
involving the question under discussion supports the view of the court in the
principal case. In that case the administrator of an estate in Missouri, where
the decedent was domiciled, was allowed to be sued in Kansas by a creditor of the
decedent after the Missouri non-claim statute had run. The case might have
been distinguished from the principal case on the ground that in the principal case
the estate had been administered and the administrator discharged, while in the
Kansas case this was not true. In any event, because of the purpose and policy
of non-claim statutes, it seems that the view opposite that taken by the court is
the more desirable one.
It should be noted, however, that there are two separate grounds, not referred
to by the court in its opinion, upon which the result reached in the principal case

8. Hill v. Barton, 194 Mo. App. 325,
188 S.W. 1105 (1916); 24 C. J. (1921).
9. Lipperd v. Lipperd, 181 Mo. App.
106, 163 S. W. 934 (1914) (holding the
plaintiff not barred); Hunt v. Fay, 7 Vt.
170 (1835) (holding the plaintiff barred).
10. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242
U. S. 394 (1917); Benoist v. Murrin, 48
Mo. 48 (1871).
11. Davis v. Shepard, 135 Wash. 124,
237 Pac. 21 (1925).
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12. Rountree v. Montague, 30 Cal. App.
170, 157 Pac. 623 (1916).
13. Mo.REv. STAT. (1929) § 869.
14. Davis v. Shepard, 135 Wash. 124,
237 Pac. 21 (1925).
15. Security Trust Co. v. Black River
National Bank, 187 U. S. 211 (1902);
Goodno v. Hotchkiss, 237 Fed. 686 (D.
Conn. 1916).
16. Toner v. Conqueror Trust Co., 131
Kan. 651, 293 Pac. 745 (1930).
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may be justified. An exception to the Kansas non-claim statute1 7 is that it shall
not bar infants. The claim sued upon in the principal case was in favor of infants. Furthermore, the obligation was that of a partnership. Some courts hold
that non-claim statutes do not apply to partnership obligations," 8 though the contrary view is also taken." It appears, therefore, that the case reaches the proper
result. It was, however, unnecessary as well as unfortunate, that the reasons
given by the court for attaining this result were employed.
SEsco V. TIPTON

EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS AS EVIDENCE.

In re Pitcairn's Estate,
The alleged will of Mary Pitcairn was contested on the ground that the instrument was not executed with the formalities required by statute. The testimony
of the subscribing witnesses tended to prove that the statutory requirement that
the testatrix sign in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses know
they were attesting a will was not complied with. Held, the presumption of due
execution, which arises from proof of the genuineness of the signatures, is independent evidence which may be weighed against positive testimony and is itself
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the will was properly executed.
The holding of the California court giving probative weight to a legal presumption is adequately sustained by prior decisions in that state. 2 Without
regard to whether it can be said that the California statutes specifically authorize
such treatment, they do at least lend legislative sanction to the evidentiary effect
given to presumptions by court decisions. 3 The same result, however, has been
reached in a few states which have no relevant statutes.4 The position of the
California court is contrary to the rule in most states,5 as well as that in the federal
courts,' and is almost universally condemned by legal commentators.7 The preferable rule is that when contradictory evidence is adduced the presumption as
affirmative evidence fades out of existence, leaving the fact finder only the facts
8
that gave rise to the presumption to weigh against the opposing evidence.

17. KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) tit.
22, § 702.
18. Pendleton v. Phelps, 19 Fed. Cas.
No. 10, 923 (C. C. Conn. 1810); Corson v.
Berson, 86 Cal. 433, 25 Pac. 7 (1890).
19. Fillyau v. Laverty, 3 Fla. 72 (1850);
Nagle v. Ball, 71 Miss. 330, 13 So. 929
(1893).
1. 59 P. (2d) 90 (Cal. 1936).
2. People v. Milner, 122 Cal. 171, 54
Pac. 833 (1898); Hitchcock v. Rooney, 171
Cal. 285, 152 Pac. 913 (1915); Smellie v.
Southern Pacific Co., 212 Cal. 540, 299
Pac. 529 (1931). Cf. In re Bryant's Estate,
3 Cal. (2d) 58, 43 P. (2d) 529 (1935). See
also (1930) 18 CALIF. L. REV. 418; (1932)
21 CALIF. L. REV. 65; (1933) So. CALIF.
L. REV. 163.
3. See CAL. CODE OF CIv. PROC.
(Deering, 1923) §§ 1957, 1963, 2061 (2).
4. Egbers v. Egbers, 177 Ill. 82, 52
N. E. 285 (1898); Clifford v. Taylor, 204
Mass. 358, 90 N. E. 862 (1910); re Cowdry,
77 Vt. 359, 60 Ad. 141 (1905); 22 C. J. 82,
§ 25, n. 54.
5. Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315

Pa. 497, 173 Ad. 644 (1934), 95 A. L. R
878 (1935); 22 C. J. 124, § 61, n. 52.
6. Lincoln v. French, 105 U. S. 614
(1881); Chambliss v. United States, 218
Fed. 154 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914). Contra:
Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432
(1895).
7. 5 WVIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
§ 2491; THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE (1898) 314; 2 CHAMBERLAYNE,
EVIDENCE (1911) §§ 1083, 1085; Bohlen,
Rebuttable Presumptions of Law (1920) 68
U. OF PA. L. REV. 307. For median view
see (1908) 8 COL. L. REV. 127.
8. ". . . the peculiar effect of a presumption 'of law' (that is, the real presumption) is merely to invoke a rule of
law compelling the jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the
contrary from the opponent. If the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary
(sufficient to satisfy the judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption
disappears as a rule of law, and the case
is in the jury's hands free from any rule."
5 WVIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
§ 2491.
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In general the Missouri courts seem to have taken the position that contradicted presumptions should not be given evidentiary weight, 9 but the language of
some of the decisions seems to indicate that there has been some deviation.1O In
the case of German EvangelicalBethel Church v. Reith," which involved facts somewhat similar to those of the principal case, the court said that proponents did not
abandon the presumption of due execution even when contradictory testimony of
the surviving witnesses was introduced in evidence. If this opinion is to be interpreted as giving probative weight to the presumption as such, it is then in
accord with the holding in the principal case but in apparent conflict with the
greater number of Missouri decisions on this point. It is submitted that the conclusion arrived at by the Missouri court was a result of facts peculiar to this case
and that the decision should not be taken to stand for the general proposition that
a legal presumption may be given evidentiary weight after it is contradicted by
evidence. One possible distinction suggested within the opinion itself is that the
contradictory testimony was adduced involuntarily on the part of proponents,
since the law required them to call the surviving attesting witnesses. Another
possible distinction is that the court really meant that the factual basis of the
presumption was to be weighed as evidence for proponents rather than that the
presumption as such should be given probative force. If the last suggested interpretation is correct, the opinion is then not open to the objection raised against
the rule followed in California.
As Professor Chaffee has pointed out,12 presumptions of law may be divided
into two types: those based solely upon some public policy and those which have a
"logical core." An example of the former is the presumption which arises when
it is shown that goods were damaged in transit, that the last carrier was at fault.
It is apparent that the probability is no greater that the last carrier caused the
damage than the first, or any subsequent carrier, was at fault. Illustrative of the
"logical core" type is the presumption that a letter properly addressed and mailed
was received in course of post. Experience has demonstrated that there is only a
very slight probability that a letter properly addressed and mailed will not be
received in course of post.13 In this situation the law, being cognizant of the fact
that in the great majority of cases it would be futile to compel the sender to prove

9. State cx rel. Detroit . . . Ins. Co.
v. Ellison, 268 Mo. 239, 187 S. W. 23 (1916);
Stack v. General Baking Co., 283 Mo. 396,
223 S. W. 89 (1920), noted in (1922) 23
U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 39. In the latter
case it is interesting to note the peculiar
error that was made. Not only was the
presumption excluded but also the fact that
gave rise to the presumption. See also
Mockowik v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B.
R. R., 196 Mo. 550, 94 S. W. 256 (1906);
dissenting opinion in Reynolds v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 274 Mo. 83, 105, 201 S. W.
1128, 1134 (1918).
10. ". . . to overcome the natural
presumption against suicide there should be
a great preponderance of evidence." Almond v. Modern Woodmen of America,
133 Mo. App. 382, 388, 113 S. W. 695, 697
(1908). ". . . it [presumption] can be
considered in measuring the credibility or
probative force of the evidence presented."
Guthrie v. Gillespie, 319 Mo. 1137, 1146,
6 S. W. (2d) 886, 890 (1928). ".
whether they [presuriptions] have been
overcome is for the jury." Berry v.
Adams, 71 S. W. (2d) 126, 131, (Mo. App.
1934). See also McCaskey Register Co. v.
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Erffmeyer, 46 S. W. (2d) 256 (Mo. App.
1932); German Evangelical Bethel Church
v. Reith, 327 Mo. 1098, 39 S. W. (2d) 1057
(1931); (1922) 23 U. or Mo. BULL. L. SER.

39. When res ipsa loquitur is applicable

the Missouri rule is that plaintiff's prima
facie case does not disappear on the introduction of conflicting evidence but remains
to be weighed by the jury against defendant's evidence. Lober v. Kansas City, 74
S. W. (2d) 815 (Mo. 1934).
11. 327 Mo. 1098, 39 S. AV. (2d) 1057
(1931), 76 A. L. R. 617 (1932). It may be
helpful to bear in mind the two following
rules: The general rule is that the burden
of proving due execution of a will is upon
proponents. In re Cullberg's Estate, 169
Cal. 365, 146 Pac. 888 (1915); 68 C. J. 980
§ 748, n. 35. A will may be proved in
spite of the adverse testimony of all the
attesting witnesses. Re Christenson, 128
Minn. 17, 150 N. W. 213 (1914).
12. Chafee, The Progress of the Law
(1921) 35 HARV. L. REv. 302.
13. Since the addressee has control of
the evidence, this presumption has also a
policy basis.
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receipt of the letter, raises a presumption that the letter was received, thus lightening the burden of proof on the sender and saving the time of the court. If, however, contradictory evidence is introduced, it is then apparent that no longer can
the assumption safely be made that it would be futile to go into the matter fully
for the purpose of determining whether the letter actually was received.
The presumption in the principal case is of this second type, and the above
reasoning is equally applicable. A presumption is merely a rule of law the significant effect of which is to cast on the party against whom it operates the burden of
going forward with the evidence.14 When no rebutting evidence is submitted the
issue is decided according to the presumption not because the presumption is evidence, but rather because it is a rule of substantive law so directing. Whatever
justification there may be for giving probative effect to a presumption based on
some public policy, it is clear that there is no adequate reason for giving independent
evidentiary weight to a presumption based solely upon usual fact. In any instance
it seems objectionable to require the fact finder, particularly a jury, to weigh a rule
of law against facts adduced in evidence. The presumption in the principal case
is obviously one based not on policy but on usual fact only. Therefore, it seems
enough that the fact finder should give weight to the facts in evidence.
WM. D.

RUSSELL

EVIDENCE-UNCONTADICTED EVIDENCE.

Williams v. Excavating & Foundation Co.)
Defendant's employee ran over and killed plaintiffs' son. Plaintiffs sued in
a negligence action based upon the theory that the driver had violated an
ordinance of the city of St. Louis requiring the operator of a slowmoving
vehicle to drive it as close to the right hand side of the street as possible
except when overtaking and passing another vehicle. After the accident the
driver gave a written statement to the police, part of which set out that prior to
the moment he saw the boy dart off the sidewalk and before he swerved in an
attempt to avoid striking him, he had actually been operating his truck as near
the curb as he could. This statement was introduced by plaintiffs. No evidence
contradicted the driver's claim of having been close to the curb. The court instructed the jury, "To whatever extent it constituted the only evidence in the
case upon a point in issue, it is to be taken as conclusive. . . ." The court then
modified this statement somewhat by the words, "To whatever extent there were
other facts and circumstances in evidence from which the jury could have drawn
an inference contrary to the driver's version of the facts, then to that extent
plaintiffs are not bound by the driver's statement ...
" (Italics the writer's.)
The appellate court upheld the instruction.
The question as to the weight to be placed upon uncontradicted evidence is
one which has long been troublesome and which has been discussed since early
times. Formerly the general conception was that if a man made any statement
whatsoever under oath, he should be believed unless directly contradicted. The
juries seem to have thought (as they very often still think) that direct unqualified
testimony by an eye-witness or an ear-witness had to be believed unless it was
distinctly contradicted.2
The modern tendency is expressed by Wigmore who says, "The mere assertion
of any witness does not of itself need to be believed, even though he is unimpeached
in any manner. . . ." We must bear in mind that one of the functions of the

i§

14.

5 WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE

(2d ed. 1923)

1.

93 S. W. (2d) 123 (Mo. App. 1936).

2490, 2491; 2 CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE
(1911)
§ 1019; THAYER, PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) 314, 575,

2. 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1883) 400.
3. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)

576.

§ 2034.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1936

19

Law Review,LAW
Vol. 1, Iss.
4 [1936], Art. 5
REVIEW
MISSOURI
zMissouri
court is to direct a verdict when the evidence so preponderates upon one side of
the question that there can be no reasonable doubt as to any question of fact. Is
the mere fact that evidence is uncontradicted sufficient basis to justify the court
in directing a verdict or, if the uncontradicted evidence is confined to one issue, in
directing the jury that upon that particular issue they must find in accordance
with the uncontradicted evidence? Most courts hold that one function of the
jury is to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and, therefore, even though unimpeached, uncontradicted evidence must be passed upon by the jury.4
Missouri has probably gone farther in this direction than any jurisdiction with
the possible exception of Pennsylvania whose stand upon the question is very
similar to that of Missouri. 5 It has been decided by the Missouri Supreme Court
that in no case whatsoever where oral testimony is given upon a question of fact
can a verdict be ordered by mandatory instruction from the court; and that in all
cases the jury have the absolute right to determine whether uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony convinces them. In the case of Gannon v. Ladede Gaslight
Co.,6 the court said, "When either party to a controversy submits testimony (other
than written instruments that call for the court's construction of their meaning
and import) to sustain his or her burden of proof, the other party though offering
nothing to contradict it is entitled to have the jury pass upon the whole case, and
to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their
7
The
." The Gannon case has been accepted as law in Missouri.
testimony. ..
effect of this case has been virtually to prohibit the court from directing a verdict
upon the basis of oral uncontradicted testimony.
Yet in the principal case we find the court apparently turning in the other
direction. The effect of the words of the court is to take from the jury its right
to weigh the credibility of the testimony of the uncontradicted witness. True
enough, the court makes provision for the jury to consider other facts and circumstances in evidence, but in the absence of such circumstances having actually been
introduced in evidence, the instruction compels the jury to accept the driver's
uncontradicted testimony as true. 8 If the mere presentation of the evidence of a
4. Hickman v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 90
S. W. (2d) 177 (Mo. App. 1936); Lesser v.
Wunder, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 70 (1880); Barker
v. Lewis Pub. Co., 152 Mo. App. 706, 131
S. W. 924 (1910); Talge Mahogany Co. v.
Burrows, 191 Ind. 167, 130 N. E. 865
(1921); Markowitz v. N. Y. Rys., 176 N.
Y. Supp. 778, 188 App. Div. 482 (1919);
United Traction Co. v. Monohan, 190 N. Y.
Supp. 425, 116 Misc. Rep. 609 (1921); Lindenbaum v. N. Y., N. H., & Hartford R. R.,
197 Mass. 314, 84 N. E. 129 (1908); Nydes
v. Royal Neighbors of America, 256 Pa.
381, 100 At. 944 (1917). Contra: Wells v.
Lusk, 188 Mo. App. 63, 173 S. W. 750
(1915); Dunlap v. Smith, 25 Ill. App. 288
(1888); Larson v. Glos, 235 Ill. 584, 85 N.
E. 926 (1908); Keene v. Behan, 40 Wash.
505, 82 Pac. 884 (1905); Dolhonde v. Lemoine, 32 La. Ann. 251 (1880).
5. Dzsujko v. Eureka-Maryland Assur.
Corp., 109 Pa. Super. 9, 165 Atl. 518 (1933).
In this case the court says that the rule in
Pennsylvania that where evidence is oral
only, the case is for the jury, no matter
how clear, convincing, uncontradicted or
one-sided the evidence may be. NantyGlo Boro. v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa.
236, 163 Ad. 523 (1932); McGlinn Distilling
Co. v. Dervin, 260 Pa. 414, 103 Atl. 872
(1918).
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6. 145 Mo. 502, 46 S. W. 968 (1898).
7. In the case of Hunter v. Wethington, 205 Mo. 284, 103 S. W. 543 (1907),
the court says that it does not follow that
because two witnesses testified to the defendant's adverse possession for ten years,
and their testimony was .undisputed, that
the court should have given judgment for
the defendant. The credibility of their
testimony was for the trier of the factsthe jury. Adams v. Modern Woodmen of
America, 145 Mo. App. 207, 130 S. W. 113
(1910); Dudley v. Wabash R. Co., 167 Mo.
App. 647, 150 S. W. 737 (1912); Wrightsman v. Glidewell, 210 Mo. App. 367, 239
S. W. 574 (1922).
8. The case of Schwartz v. Germania
Life Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 215 (1875), defines
the function of the jury as followed by the
weight of authority. It states in substance
that the jury is not obliged to receive
passively and follow blindly, testimony
presented to it, though there is no contradictory evidence; but they are to examine
and scrutinize the evidence carefully, and
to follow it only so far as it seems reasonable
and true. The case of Barker v. Lewis
Pub. Co., 152 Mo. App. 706, 131 S. W. 924
(1910), presents the usual Missouri attitude
upon the question of the function of the
jury. The court says: ". . . the matter
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fact is to be called its proof, because undisputed by any other witness or witnesses,
then the right of the jury to judge the weight of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses in such cases means nothing. 9
There must not only be the presentation of evidence of a fact by a witness or
witnesses, but such evidence must have been accepted by the jury before proof can
be said to have been made complete upon any given point. If what has been said
fails to convince the jury, then no sufficient proof has been made, however positive
or unqualified the utterance of witnesses. In many cases the testimony may tend
to prove a given issue but still fall far short of convincing the jury. 0
A possible distinction may be drawn between the principal case and most
cases of uncontradicted evidence. In the principal case, the witness whose testimony was held to be conclusive against the plaintiffs was offered by the plaintiffs
themselves, whereas in most cases of uncontradicted evidence the witness whose
testimony is held to be conclusive is introduced by the party who benefits by the
operation of the conclusive presumption. The court, however, makes no mention
of this difference and treats the case just as though one of the defendant's witnesses
(rather than one of the plaintiffs') had given the apparently damaging uncontradicted evidence.
In view of the numerous decisions by Missouri courts to the effect that no
matter how convincing the testimony may be, the jury must pass upon its credibilityu, it is difficult to see upon what basis the court sustained the instruction in
the principal case.
MORTON M. LEIBOWITZ
TORTS-MISREPRESENTATION

BY TURNING BACK SPEEDOMETER ON USED CAR AS

CONSTITUTING FRAUD.

Jones v. AWest Side Buick Co.,
In 1930, S purchased a new 1931 Buick Sedan from D. He drove the car until
August, 1933, when he traded it in as part of the purchase price of a new car. D
took the old car which had been driven approximately 48,800 miles, as shown by
the speedometer, and sent it to the repair shop. When the car was completely
reconditioned, D caused the speedometer to be turned back from its true figure to
make it read "22,400 odd miles." P purchased the car in August, 1933, paying D
$825.00 for it. He saw the car before he bought it, noted the speedometer reading
and, according to the finding of the jury, relied on the reading. When he learned
the true distance the car had been driven P sued D for $500 actual and $10,000
punitive damages. A verdict was returned in favor of P for $150 actual damages
and $2,000 punitive damages. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed.
Speaking generally, fraud assumes so many hues and guises, and appears in
such a variety of forms that courts have consistently refused to predefine just
what conduct will amount to fraud.2 It may be said, however, that the occur-

of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight and value of their testimony is one
for the jury. The mere fact that no one
contradicted Nelson's testimony does not
relieve it from the operation of the rule
authorizing the jury to give judgment on
its weight and credibility. It is unnecessary to discuss the matter for the authorities are directly in point and conclusive."
[Italics the writer's.] Davidson v. St. Louis
Transit Co., 211 Mo. 320, 109 S.W. 583
(1908).
9. Gannon v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 145
Mo. 502, 46 S. W. 968 (1898).
10. Bradley v. Becker, 296 Mo. 548, 246

S. W. 561 (1922); Mundy v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry, 45 S. W. (2d) 941 (Mo. App.
1932); Kneuven v. Berliner's Estate, 54 S.
W. (2d) 494 (Mo. App. 1932); Hickman v.
St. Louis Dairy Co., 90 S.W. (2d) 177 (Mo.
App. 1936); Shaw v. Fulkerson, 96 S. W.
(2d) 495 (Mo. 1936).
11. Gannon v. Laclede Gas Light Co.,
145 Mo. 502, 46 S. W. 968 (1898); Whittington v. Westport Hotel Operating Co., 326
Mo. 1117, 33 S. W. (2d) 963 (1930).
1. 93 S.W. (2d) 1083 (Mo. App. 1936).
2. Clyce v. Anderson, 49 Mo. 37
(1871); Stonemets v. Head, 248 Mo. 243,
154 S.W. 108 (1913).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1936

21

r Missouri
MISSOURI
LAW
Law Review,
Vol. 1,REVIEW
Iss. 4 [1936], Art. 5
rence of certain elements in a transaction will entitle a party to base an action of
fraud and deceit. It is usually said that there must be a misrepresentation of a
material fact' upon which the party seeking relief may reasonably rely' and upon
which he did rely5 to his detriment.6
Representations as to value are generally not considered statements of fact.7
But representations as to the conditions upon which value is based are representations of fact. A speedometer reading is an important consideration in determining the value of a used car.8 All the other elements of fraud were clearly present.
D in the principal case attempted to justify his action on the existence of a
custom or usage among dealers in second-hand automobiles to set back the speedometer of the vehicle they seek to sell to a mileage commensurate with the extent
to which the car has been repaired by the dealer before being put upon the secondhand market. But the court refused to recognize the validity of a custom which
is designed only to deceive and to allow the sellers of used cars to obtain an unfair
and undue advantage over their customers. 9 However, it must be conceded that
the custom that dealers do, as here alleged, set back speedometers has some basis
in fact in the popular mind; yet seemingly only three cases have dealt with the
question.10 It is well recognized in the law that some leeway is allowed the vendor
in actually misrepresenting the quality of his wares." Puffer and exaggeration is
expected from sellers and this is popularly regarded as a privilege to lie. Representations pertaining to the mileage of a car made in the negotiations leading up
to the sale of second-hand cars have been treated by laymen in much the same
fashion that courts have treated similar misrepresentations involved in the sale
of chattels in which the principle of caveat emptor has governed.12
It is believed that the decision in the principal case has opened in Missouri a
fertile field for litigation. What limitations will be put upon the case remain to
be seen, though it is hard to conceive that punitive damages will be awarded so
liberally another time. It might be suggested that the court reached a good result, both from the standpoint of legal principle and general commercial desirability, but the case raises an irritating conjecture as to the extent the Missouri
court will go in indulging the gullibility of the purchaser. The question remains,
may there be reasonable reliance in cases of this kind?
FRANcis E. CROSBY

3. Moore v. Cains, 116 Mass. 396
(1874); Bowman v. Branson, 111 Mo. 343,
19 S. W. 634 (1892).
4. 14 Cyc. 115.
5. Warren v. Ritchie, 128 Mo. 311, 30
S. W. 1023 (1895); Kirkendall v. Hartsock,
58 Mo. App. 234 (1894).
6. Jolliffe v. Collins, 21 Mo. 338 (1855);
Peers v. Davis, Adm'r, 29 Mo. 184 (1859);
Parker v. Marquis, 64 Mo. 38 (1876).
7. Parker v. Moulton, 114 Mass. 99,
19 Am. Rep. 315 (1873); Homer v. Perkins,
124 Mass. 431, 26 Am. Rep. 677 (1878);
Pigott v. Graham, 48 Wash. 348, 93 Pac.
435 (1908).
8. Fosburg v. Couture, 217 Pac. 1001
(Wash. 1923).
9. Sherrill-Russell Lbr. Co. v. Krug
Lbr. Co., 216 Mo. App. 1, 267 S. W. 14
(1924).
10. Nash Co. v. Childress, 156 Miss.
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157, 125 So. 708 (1930); Lizana v. Edwards
Motor Sales Co., 163 Miss. 266, 141 So. 295
(1932); cf. Fosburg v. Couture, 217 Pac.
1001 (Wash. 1923) (in which the reading of
the speedometer seems only to have been
incidentally relied upon). The cases are
distinguished in (1936) 21 St. Louis L.
Rev. 341.
11. Dugan v. Cureton, 1 Ark. 31, 31
Am. Dec. 727 (1837); Endsley v. Johns, 120
Ill. 469, 12 N. E. 247 (1887); Westerman v.
Corder, 86 Kan. 239, 119 Pac. 868 (1912).
12. Forrest v. Benson, 150 Ark. 89, 233
S. W. 916 (1921); Singer Sewing Mach. Co.
v. Wardlaw, 29 Ga. App. 626, 116 S. E.
207 (1923); Harrison v. Broadway Motor
Co., 128 Miss. 766, 91 So. 453 (1922); Fargo
Gas & Coke Co. v. Fargo Gas & Elec. Co.,
4 N. D. 219 (1895); and see 1 WILLISTON,
SALES (2d ed. 1924) 336; Waite, Caveat
Emptor and the Judicial Process (1925) 25
HARv. L. REV. 129.
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TRIAL-MISTRIAL FOR PREJUDICIAL EVIDENcE-NEcESSITY OF MOTION TO STRIKE.

State v. Beatty'
Defendant, appellant here, was charged by information with disturbing the
peace of one Everett English by swearing, threatening, and challenging to fight.
Prosecuting witness, English, testified that Beatty drove up to him as he was
working in his field, threatened to beat him up, and cursed him. English also
testified, "I saw he was drunk." The statement as to defendant's drunkenness
was objected to as a conclusion of the witness, as immaterial and irrelevant, not
tending to prove or disprove any issue in the case, and as prejudicial to the rights
of the defendant. Defendant's counsel moved that a mistrial be declared and the
jury discharged. The court overruled the objection and the defendant excepted.
Held: That the statement as to defendant's drunkenness was a voluntary statement of the witness and not in response to the question asked. Under such circumstances, if the defendant wished to object to the answer and save his point
as to the ruling thereon, it was his duty to move to strike the evidence and ask
that it be disregarded. Since there was no motion to strike, even though the
evidence was improper as a conclusion of the witness and irrelevant because of
bringing into the case evidence of the commission of a crime of which defendant
was not accused, that of driving a car while intoxicated, the point was not saved.
The necessity for a discharge of the jury was largely within the discretion of the
trial judge and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in that respect.
The rule that the proper remedy for an answer not responsive to the question
asked, is to move to strike, is well settled in Missouri. 2 Equally well settled is
the concept that whether or not such circumstances require a discharge of the
3
jury before the trial is completed is largely within the discretion of the trial court.
The question suggested by the principal case is: What is the proper procedure to
pursue in order to insist that evidence given voluntarily by a witness is prejudicial to the jury? The principal case would seem to answer that question inferentially. If the appellate court upholds the ruling of the trial court that the
testimony of the witness does not present sufficient grounds upon which to declare
a mistrial, there is nothing left for the appellate court to review because no other
remedy has been requested. In view of the fact that appellate courts are always
loth to disturb the trial court's ruling on the necessity of a mistrial, it appears
advisable to request a discharge of the jury, and, upon receiving an adverse ruling,
to save exception to that ruling, and then go further and move to strike out the
improper evidence, and except to this ruling also if the motion is denied. If the
latter motion is sustained, the moving party should make it clear to the court
that he has not thereby acquiesced in the refusal of his motion to discharge the
jury. 4 Thus, if both motions are denied in the trial court, the appellate court
may review them both; or, if the motion to discharge the jury is overruled and

1. 94 S. W. (2d) 907 (Mo. App. 1936).
2. State v. Eisenhour, 132 Mo. 140,
33 S. W. 785 (1896); Waddell v. Metropolitan Street Ry., 113 Mo. App. 680, 88
S. W. 765 (1905); State v. Sykes, 191 Mo.
62, 89 S. W. 851 (1905); State v. Bateman,
198 Mo. 212, 94 S.W. 843 (1906); State v.
Farrar, 285 S. W. 1000 (Mo. 1926); State
v. Austin, 29 S.W. (2d) 686 (Mo. 1930);
State v. Gould, 329 Mo. 828, 46 S. W. (2d)
886 (1932); State v. Raffle, 60 S. W. (2d)
668 (Mo. App. 1933).
3. Kennedy v. Holladay, 105 Mo. 24,
16 S. W. 688 (1891); Hamburger v. Rinkel,
164 Mo. 398, 64 S. W. 104 (1901); State v.
Topalovacki, 213 S. W. 104 (Mo. 1919);

State v. Sinovich, 329 Mo. 909, 46 S. W.
(2d) 877 (1931).

4. There are no cases in Missouri on
the question of the sustaining of the second
motion amounting to a waiver of the first.
However, in this state, where incompetent
evidence is admitted over proper objection
and exception, a party may offer instruction
on the issue thus forced upon him without
waiving the right to challenge the competency of the evidence. Newman v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 192 Mo. App. 159,
177 S. W. 803 (1915); Caruthersville Lumber Co. v. Taylor, 281 S. V. 97 (Mo. App.
1926). These cases are indicative that
there should be no waiver in the above
situation.
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the motion to strike sustained, the objector has obtained the best possible remedy
in the trial court, and at the same time has preserved for appellate review his contention that a mistrial should have been declared. This method will protect a
party against prejudicial evidence going to the jury without, at least, an admonition from the court to disregard it.

O.S. BREWER

TORTs-LIABILITY OF ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES TO INFANT TRESPASSERS.

Blavatt v. Union Electric Light and Power Co.'
The defendant power company erected and maintained a self-functioning substation. On the lot behind the substation there were transformers and high
voltage electric wires. This lot was adjacent to one which had been used for some
years previously and still was used as a playground by children. The transformers and high voltage wires were surrounded by a brick wall seven to ten feet
high. The only entrance to the enclosure was by means of an iron gate supported
by three hinges, which was kept locked. On this gate were warning signs. The
plaintiff's son, an eighth grade student who could read, and other children were
in the habit of using the brick walls of the enclosure as a backstop for handball
games. To retrieve balls which went over the wall into the enclosure, one of the
children would climb to the top of the wall by means of the protruding hinges on
the gate. The plaintiff's son, while retrieving a ball from within the enclosure,
was severely injured by coming in contact with a wire, and died soon after. There
was no evidence that the defendant had actual knowledge of children using the
structure. The plaintiff contends that, under the theory set forth in sections 205
and 209 of the Tentative Draft of the Restatement of Torts,2 the defendant owed to
the children the duty of keeping a watchman or of fencing the structure. The
trial court rendered judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. This
judgment was affirmed on appeal on the ground that there was no duty owed to
trespassers except to refrain from wilful and wanton injuries to them. Also, the
court apparently bases its opinion upon the fact that the building of the wall and
the posting of the warning sign constituted sufficient care to discharge the duty
to the children in the absence of proof of knowledge on the part of the defendant
of the presence of the children.
While the denial of recovery upon the facts of this case does not appear to
be particularly harsh or out of line with former decisions upon similar facts rendered by this court, yet it is difficult and interesting to attempt to determine
whether the court based its decision upon the lack of a duty to the deceased or
upon the lack of a breach of such duty if it existed.
The court sets out the general rule as to the non-liability of a possessor of land
to trespassers except for wilful and wanton injuries. 3 It points out that the "attractive nuisance" doctrine will not be extended, in Missouri, beyond the "turntable cases." 4 Next, the court, in answer to the plaintiff's contentions of there
being a duty to use reasonable care based upon sections 205 and 209 of the Restatement,' says: "We neither adopt nor reject, because unnecessary, the statement

1. 335 Mo. 151,71 S.W.(2d)736(1934).
2. These sections became sections 335
and 339 of RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934).
The rule stated in section 335 relates to the
conditions under which a possessor of land
is subject to liability to constant trespassers upon a limited area thereof for
harm caused to them by a highly dangerous
condition created or maintained by him
upon the land. Section 339 states the
special duty owed by a possessor of land

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol1/iss4/5

as to artificial conditions highly dangerous
to trespassing children.
3. Berry v. St. Louis, M. and S. E.
R. R., 214 Mo. 593, 114 S. W. 27 (1908);
Kelly v. Benas, 217 Mo. 1, 116 S. XX. 557
(1909).
4. Howard v. St. Joseph Transmission
Co., 316 Mo. 317, 289 S. W. 597 (1926);
Marcheck v. Klute, 133 Mo. App. 280, 113
S. W. 654 (1908).
5. RESTATEMIENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 335,
339.
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of principles quoted from the tentative draft of the Restatement of the Law of
Torts. It is enough to say that they do not make out a case of negligence upon
the record before us." Later, in its opinion, the court states: "It is obvious that
there are not here facts to invoke the principles of attractive nuisance cases." In
the last paragraph of the opinion the court says: "In our opinion the high brick
wall was a sufficient barrier against trespassers, if not to exclude them, at least to
fulfill defendant's duty toward them."
If the court intended the preceding quotations merely as further justifications
for the result reached in the case, then the decision is merely a reiteration of preceding Missouri decisions holding that no duty arises to an infant trespasser in a
case of this nature. 6 However, if the court by the quoted statement meant to
imply that there was a duty owed to the child to use reasonable care but that there
had been no breach of this duty, then this case might easily serve as a turning
7
point in cases of this kind.
It would not be inconsistent with the standard of care in general imposed
upon electric power companies in the maintenance of their equipment by the
Missouri decisions, upon policy at least, to require a reasonable degree of care to
protect infant trespassers in such a manner. The court has referred to the degree
of care imposed upon power companies in the maintenance of their equipment in
the following terms: "the highest degree of care"' , "care commensurate with the
duty and obligation it has voluntarily assumed ' 9, "the utmost care."1 0 These
quotations show the courts as having high regard for the subtle and dangerous
nature of electrical current. The reluctance of the court in allowing the defense
of contributory negligence as a matter of law further demonstrates the recognition
by the court of the hidden and not easily ascertained dangers of electrical energy.
The fact that a plaintiff was a trespasser upon the property of a third party injured
by negligently maintained electrical equipment is not available as a defense."I
These decisions seem to indicate that the courts of Missouri recognize the dangerous propensities of electrical energy and show a high regard for human life.
Where the defendant power company was allowed to maintain uninsulated,
high voltage wires upon a pole, equipped with steps easily within reach of a child,
near a place frequented by youthful swimmers, the court merely stated that the
"attractive nuisance" doctrine would not be extended past the "turntable cases"
and thus imposed no duty on the power company to use reasonable care in protecting children who climbed the pole.12 On social policy, this holding, where
injuries result from negligently maintained wires, is difficult to reconcile with
the cases where an infant trespasser climbing in the tree on the land of a third
party comes in contact with uninsulated high voltage wires strung through the
branches of the tree. 3 In these latter cases heavy damages have been allowed.
Surely there is little difference as to the foreseeability of the risk of injury between

6.

Howard v. St. Joseph Transmission

9. Kuhlman v. Water, Light, and
Transit Co., 307 Mo. 607, 271 S. W. 788
(1925).
10. Thornton v. Union Elec. Light and
7. This change may be based upon the Power Co., 72 S. W. (2d) 161 (Mo. App.
"implied invitation" theory of the "at- 1934).
tractive nuisance" doctrine. United Zinc
11. Hill v. Union Elec. Light and Power
and Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268
260 Mo. 43, 169 S. W. 345 (1914);
(1921). Or upon a duty to use care to Co.,
prevent forseeable injuries to infant tres- Geismann v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co.,
173 Mo. 654, 73 S. W. 654 (1903).
passers as adopted by the RESTATEMENT,
12. Howard v. St. Joseph Transmission
ToRTS § 339. For further discussion see
Co., 316 Mo. 317, 289 S. W. 597 (1926).
(1932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 459; (1923) 36
HAzv. L. REv. 350.
13. Godfrey v. Kansas City Light and
8. Foster v. K. C., C. C. and S. J. Power Co., 299 Mo. 472, 253 S. W. 233
Ry., 325 Mo. 18, 26 S. W. (2d) 770 (1930); (1923); Shannon v. Kansas City Light and
Smith v. Southwest Mo. R. R., 333 Mo. Power Co., 315 Mo. 1136, 287 S. W. 1031
314, 62 S. W. (2d) 761 (1933).
(1926).
Co., 316 Mo. 317, 289 S. W. 597 (1926);
Kansas City Power and Light Co. v.
Trimble, 315 Mo. 32, 285 S. W. 455 (1926).
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a child's tendency to climb trees and that to climb poles equipped with convenient
steps. Giving so much greater weight, as the former case does, to property rights
than to foreseeable risks of life and limb seems inconsistent with the otherwise
liberal policy of the court in respect to injuries from this source.
Thus, in view of the dangers involved, it appears that the court might, with
consistency of policy toward protection of human life and limb, if faced squarely
by a case where a power company did not use sufficient safeguards to protect infant trespassers, recognize a duty to use such care. While, as before stated, it is
difficult to determine the weight given by the court to the statements in the principal case referring to the view taken by the Restatement of the Law of Torts, in
which such a duty is recognized, yet it seems that it might well be taken as a turning
point in the law. At least, the approach to the solution of these cases from the
traditional position of the possessor of land seems outmoded and unsatisfactory,
particularly where such highly dangerous artificial conditions exist on the premises.
H. L. LISLE
WILLS-CHARITA3BLE TRUSTs-BEQuEST DIRECTLY TO CHARITY.

Burrier v. Jones,
This was an action to construe a will which provided for the payment of the
testator's debts and funeral expenses, and devised "the remaining part of my
estate both real and personal to the Macon County, Mo, (sic) school funds."
Plaintiffs, collateral heirs of the testator, contended that this devise was void and
could not be construed as creating a charitable trust because of the testator's
failure to designate a donee, legatee or beneficiary of said property capable of
taking such property under the laws of Missouri, and that the devise was void for
uncertainty and impossible of execution; that therefore the testator died intestate
as to all property remaining after the payment of his debts and funeral expenses.
Judgment below was for defendants. After an unsuccessful motion for a new
trial, plaintiffs appealed. Judgment was affirmed, and it was held that the devise
created a valid charitable trust, legal title to the property vesting in the statutory
custodian of school funds, here the judges of the County Court of Macon County,2
for the benefit of persons entitled to receive the benefits from school funds.
This case presents facts substantially the same as those in Robinson v. Crutcher,'
wherein it was held by a divided court that no valid charitable trust was created.
In the principal case, the Supreme Court gives careful consideration to the Robinson
case and expressly overrules it, adopting the dissenting opinion of Judge Williams,
as correctly stating the law applicable to the instant case. In a note in the Missouri Law Series6 in 1921, the Robinson case was strongly criticized on the ground
1. 92. S. W. (2d) 885 (Mo. 1936).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 12127,
12128, 12129.
3. 277 Mo. 1, 209 S. W. 104 (1919).

The will in that case provided:
"4th: The residue of my property
of whatsoever kind and wheresoever situate
I will and direct shall be divided into three
equal parts.
"5th: One of such third parts I give
and bequeath to the capital of the township
school fund of T. 54, R. 10 in Monroe
County, Missouri.
"6th: One of such third parts I give
and bequeath to the capital of the public
school fund of Monroe County.
"7th: One of such third parts I give
and bequeath to the capital of the public
school fund of the state of Missouri and I
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direct my executor to pay over to the
lawful custodians of the several public
school funds mentioned in this and the
two preceding clauses of this will the
several shares given to said school funds as
aforesaid."
4. "By the terms of the will the legal
estate in the property devised or bequeathed
. . . becomes immediately vested in the
statutory custodian of the respective
school funds, and the equitable title or
beneficial enjoyment thereof is vested in the
persons who by statutory law become now,
or are hereafter entitled, to receive the
benefits from the respective school funds."
Id. at 13, 209 S. W. at 107.

5.

(1921) 21 U. or Mo. BULL. L. SER.
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that the intention of the testator to vest legal title in the lawful custodians of the
existing school funds was sufficiently clear and that the court was unduly technical
in holding that the testator's intent was to bequeath to the funds themselves, that
equity historically favored charitable trusts and relaxed the strict rules requiring
separation of legal and equitable interests as applied to private trusts.6 It was
also suggested that the court might well have found an intent on the part of the
testator to create a charitable trust, in which case equity would not allow the
trust to fail for want of a trustee.
As the law of charitable trusts developed in England, if there was a trust
created by will or otherwise but no trustee was designated (or a trustee was designated who could not take, or who died before the testator), the Chancellor exercised
what is termed judicial cy pres power and appointed a trustee to administer the
trust. 7 The charitable trust intent and the indication of a class of beneficiaries
were the essential factors. But where there was no trust expressly mentioned, as
in the case of a gift "to charity" generally, or "to the poor," there further being
no trustee named, the prerogative cy pres power of the crown was necessary to
preserve the charity8 The court of equity had no power to dispose of the property
and could only hold it at the disposal of the crown under sign manual, such a gift
being considered too vague and indefinite for. the court to execute it. The English
courts have adhered to these general rules, leaving to the crown the function of
decreeing some charitable use for the property cy pres the original purpose of
the donor.
Most American courts 9 have exercised the judicial cy pres power as part of
the regular chancery power, but a question arises as to the existence of the prerogative power in our courts. There is much dicta and some authority to the
effect that the prerogative power does not exist in the equity courts of the United
States,10 and some writers have laid it down flatly that if any such power exists it
rests with the legislatures."i However, Bogert points out that, "When one ignores
the mere dicta about the nonexistence of the prerogative power in the American
courts, and considers the specific treatment of the types of cases which have given
rise to the use of the cy pres power in England, one is not so certain that American
judges do not exercise powers which are like those of the crown in England."12

6. The majority opinion in the Robinson case stated: "In the creation of a
charitable trust it is essential that there be
a separation of the legal estate from the
beneficial enjoyment of same. . . . This
separation must be indicated by the words
of the donor, otherwise the equitable and
legal estate will meet in the same person and
the trust be extinguished by a merger of
the equitable in the legal estate." Robinson v. Crutcher, 277 Mo. 1, 8, 209 S. W.
104, 105 (1919).
7. 2 PERRY, LAW or TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 722 and cases
cited; 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
(1935) § 328 and cases cited.
8. 2 PERRY, LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 718; 2 BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 434.
9. "In Alabama, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Kentucky, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Tennessee, there are
decisions or dicta which repudiate the cy
pres doctrine, both judicial and prerogative.
The reasons for the refusal to recognize the cy pres power in these states seem
to be, first, that the courts have looked upon
cy pres as a rule of arbitrary disposition,
giving the chancellor power to remake

deeds and wills and to allocate capital or
income according to his own social or religious views; and, secondly, that cy pres in
the minds of many judges has come to be
associated with royalty and monarchial
privileges and hence has become distasteful
to officials in a democratic country." 2
BOGERT, TRUST AND TRUSTEES (1935) §
433 and cases cited. Cf. Holmes, J., in
Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 17 N. E.
839 (1888).
10. Such decisions are to be found in
those states in which cy pres is not recognized, either in its judicial or prerogative
form. Several states, including New York,
Pennsylvania, California, Minnesota, Rhode
Island, Texas and Wisconsin have prescribed a statutory form of cy pres. See 2
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935)
§
433 and citations.
11. "No such power exists in any American magistrates, judicial or ministerial, and
none can exist until it is conferred by the
legislature." 2 PERRY, LAW or TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 718, at p.
1223.
12. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
(1935) § 434, at p. 1301.
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Numerous cases decided in the last twenty years"3 indicate at least a tendency to
extend the cy pres power of American equity courts, although they do not speak
either of prerogative or judicial cy pres power in most instances. The usual method
is to imply an intention on the part of the donor to create a charitable trust, which
device is a sufficient basis for the court's appointment of a trustee or even the
framing of a scheme for the administration of the trust.
It remains to inquire in which class the principal case properly belongs; whether
it is a gift so vague and indefinite as to require the prerogative power formerly exercised by the English crown for its execution, or whether it falls within the judicial
cy pres power of the court of equity.14 It is not clear from the opinion just what
power is being exercised, the court merely finding an intention on the part of the
testator to "vest legal title in the statutory custodian of school funds." It is
believed that a bequest to the school funds of a particular county is not so vague
and indefinite, either with respect to purpose or intended beneficiaries, as to require
any prerogative power to administer the gift, and that therefore this and other
cases of gifts to specific existing funds, title to which is vested in trustees or custodians whose duties with respect thereto are clearly defined, are to be distinguished
from gifts "to charity" generally, or "to the poor." On the other hand, here is
an apt opportunity for implying a trust and appointing a trustee to administer it.
Cases of gifts to nonexistent funds S or to the poor of a town 6 or county (held valid
in American courts) would seem to call for the implication of a trust; but a gift
to an existing fund, title to which is held by a trustee or custodian, presents not
quite so extreme a situation.
The decision of the principal case is in line with what seems to be the tendency
in the United States today in cases of gifts directly to charity or to a charitable
fund, despite earlier dicta to the effect that American courts have no power corresponding to the prerogative cy pres. The extent of the authority of this case
must, of course, remain a matter of conjecture. However, it is well to have the
much criticized,7 Robinson case out of the way and the Missouri law brought into
line with what is believed to be the better view as to the construction of such
charitable gifts.
ROBERT A. WINGER
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